Discourse genres
as determiners of discursive regularities:
A case of semiotic predictability?

Jeoffrey Gaspard
Faculté de Lettres, Traduction et Communication
Université libre de Bruxelles
Av. F. D. Roosevelt 50/CP 123
1050 Brussels
Belgium
e-mail: jgaspard@ulb.ac.be

Abstract. This article focuses on discursive regularities that can generally be observed in text corpora produced in similar communication situations (medical interviews, political debates, teaching classes, etc.). One type of such regularities is related to the so-called ‘discourse genres’, considered as a set of tacit instructions broadly constraining the forms of utterances in a given discursive practice. Those regularities highlight the relatively regulated, non-random nature of most of our discursive practices and epitomize the necessary constrained creativity of meaning making in discourse. In this perspective, we suggest that the concepts of Thirdness and Habit, as theorized by Charles S. Peirce, can be fruitful in describing the role and importance of such regularities in our sociodiscursive life. More specifically, we believe that discourse regularities are ideal case studies if one wishes to investigate instances of predictability in semiotic (discursive) processes. Overall, we suggest that their study can be one of many research orientations through which a prediction-based scientific conception of semiotics could be applied.

Keywords: discourse genres; communication situation; Thirdness; predictability; Charles S. Peirce; discursive regularities

Introduction
“Semiotic (un)predictability” was the main theme of the 2015 Tartu Summer School of Semiotics, one of the reasons being that “the paradoxical co-presence of predictability and unpredictability is a fundamental aspect of the dynamics of the semiotic world”.1 Regarding discursive practices more particularly, the very notion of predictability,

1 See the original “Call for participation” of the Tartu Summer School of Semiotics 2015, available at: http://www.flfi.ut.ee/summer_school/2015/index.html.

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although not often employed in discourse analysis, is indeed relevant when defining and characterizing salient features of our daily discursive performances. In this endeavour, we believe that Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs is a fruitful framework if one wishes to make better sense philosophically and analytically of (1) how we both produce and interpret oral or written texts; and (2) how predictability and regularities, considered in our case as natural corollaries of discursive habits crystallized in text corpora, are “fundamental aspect[s] of the dynamics of the semiotic world”. This article proposes to explore briefly how some aspects of Peirce’s theory of signs could apply to the problem of discursive predictability.

1. Peirce’s phenomenological categories: a brief reminder

Adopting a Peircean perspective to scrutinize instances of semiotic predictability involves grappling, at one stage or other of the enquiry, with the philosopher’s categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness – if only because a pertinent apprehension and proper understanding of meaning-making phenomena cannot evacuate the problem of their phenomenological grounding.

Those three irreducible categories, at the basis of Peirce’s new kind of phenomenology (i.e. phaneroscopy), simply refer to three “modes of being” as experienced by human subjects. In that sense, the most obvious mode would be that of Secondness, understood as the category of the particular, the actual or the existent: it is the category of the concrete world we live in, the one that is precisely described and explained by science. Secondness is the experience of force and resistance: it points to the fact that we cannot walk through walls, that if we put our hand in boiling water, we will burn our fingers and instantly remove our hand, or that if we hear a screeching sound, we will want to cover our ears. Nevertheless, our experience cannot only be that of the concrete, physically resistant world of the philosophical “materialists”: “Materialism, as a theory, insists there is no universe but the universe of Secondness. Materialism (and nominalism) is not wrong, according to Peirce, it is just not the whole story” (Gilmore 2006: 312). Two other categories are indeed necessary to make sense of “all that is in any way or in any sense present to time to the mind” (CP 1.284): besides being confronted by existent objects of the concrete material world, we also experience real objects which, although we cannot see them as we see existing objects (e.g. a Second like a house, a tree, a cell, etc.), play a seminal role in our daily life in influencing our thought and conduct. While existence is related to Secondness, reality is also related to both Firstness and Thirdness.

More precisely, Firstness refers to “the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else” (Short 2007: 75): as pure qualities (represented by generals such as ‘redness’, ‘softness’, etc.), Firsts are conceived as
abstracted *possibilities* that can be actualized in existent objects (i.e. Seconds) to the extent to which “any such [pure] quality has to be prescinded […] from the fact of its occurring or being embodied. For the fact – that the scarlet is in the tunic or that the whistle occurred now, breaking in on my thought – involves a relation to something else” (Short 2007: 78). As such, pure qualities are thus real but not existent or actual: “[a]nything actual is some possibility actualized. We never encounter quality except as occurring, yet it is not reducible to its occurring. […] When we abstract the quality from its occurrence […] we abstract the possibility from its actualization” (Short 2007: 78).

Finally, Thirdness is the mode of being of the relationships between existent particulars. Indeed, “[as] the categories of [Firstness] and [Secondness] do not capture the aspect of experience in which we apprehend continuity, generality, and law, they do not account for our knowledge or seeming knowledge of physical bodies, dispositions, living bodies, organic functions, persons, personalities, and social organizations” (Short 2007: 80), that is to say the experience of what Peirce called the “personality” of things, whether existent or imaginary objects. Thirdness is indeed “the experience of seeing beyond the merely reactive Seconds and perceiving the relations between things, especially in terms of where they are headed” (Gilmore 2006: 312). Like Firsts, Thirds are real and attained through representations, having to be instantiated in Secondness to be experienced physically: as such, “Thirdness has the character of the mental, which is to say, relationships are *understood*, they are not literally *seen*” (Gilmore 2006: 311). An example of a Third would be gravity: no one can see it but we can feel its predicted “power” over us through the particular instances it actualizes in Secondness. All in all, “[the] universe of Thirdness is the universe of general laws, the universe of signs that indicate the adoption of a habit, of habit-taking” (Gilmore 2006: 310), which can either be natural or man-made, so that “any statement of law, whether a law of nature or a law instituted by men, entails subjunctive and counterfactual conditions: *were* a stone to be released here, it *would* fall; *had* a dozen benighted souls sworn the solemn oaths, our club *would have had* that many more members” (Short 2007: 79). The metaphor of the musical melody – as a Third – is particularly suited to differentiate between Secondness and Thirdness:

As Peirce remarks, a piece of music has two basic components, the individual notes and the “air” or melody. We experience an individual note in an instant and immediately. The air, however, we can experience only over time and mediately. We can only hear the air by hearing the separate notes: the two are inseparable, but we have to be listening to something else in the notes, something more than just the individual notes, to hear the melody. […] Peirce insists that the melody is real, incomplete, but ongoing and we can, with work and concentration, say something about it, how it goes and how it may develop in the future. […] To pay attention to the personalities of things, to listen for their melodies, is, first of all, to feel their
Secondness, and then reason one's way through deductions and inductions, to a clear and distinct conception of their Secondness. But, then, one must be attentive to and feel their Thirdness, feel the continuity and the dispositions that direct their emanations of influence, and reason one's way to a clear and more distinct conception of this Thirdness. (Gilmore 2006: 317)

Accordingly, the world of Secondness is saturated with Thirdness: any Second entity has a so-called personality, i.e. a disposition to react and behave in a certain context, guided as it is by a habit or law, yet which enjoys reality by governing actual and expected reactions. It is important to note then that reality “is enjoyed by laws that have no here-and-now existence [...]. At the same time, there would be no reality without existence. For we call no represented law real if it does not govern actual reactions” (Short 2007: 87). Finally, technically speaking, Thirdness is best exemplified in the process of semiosis itself which, as an instituted triadic relation between a Sign, an Object and its Interpretant, has the character of a law:

We have considered the relation established between a Sign and its Object [as mediated by way of the Interpretant] as a social institution, having all its characteristics: it is relative to a community and fulfills a certain number of social functions for this community (functionality of the institution), notably social communication, be it mass communication or interpersonal communication; like any institution, it has a contingent aspect and an aspect of permanence and stability. (Marty 1990: 292; my translation, J. G.)

Thus interpretation itself is the actualization of contextualized rules determining adequate interpretants to be generated. In that sense, interpreting a particular communicative situation also requires the actualization of particular stabilized complexes of (linguistic) signs to be recognized and then interpreted by speakers. In this perspective, we suggest that the discursive regularities observed in corpora of (oral or written) texts having been produced in similar communication situations (e.g. medical interviews, political debates, teaching classes, etc.) point to real discursive “melodies” that can be typified beyond the mere individual notes of the dispersed, existent utterances they are instantiated through. In the following section, we describe how discourse genres can therefore be re-interpreted as Thirds.
2. Discourse genres as Thirds

While literary scholars very early described so-called literary genres by sets of criteria qualifying their constraints on linguistic processes, researchers now strive to expand those enquiries to non-artistic discursive productions of our daily life. They acknowledge that for any given communication situation, defined as a spatiotemporal setting in which the linguistic signs were/are meant to be interpreted, the speakers always expect a particular genre to be enacted and recognized, following which they will adequately both produce and interpret subsequent utterances. In agreement with the French discourse analyst Charaudeau (2014: 49), we thus understand that the constraints of the communication situation “give discursive instructions to the enunciation and reception instances so that the latter can stage and interpret the speech acts” (my translation, J. G.). Charaudeau adds that “it is these discursive instructions that assure a part of the mutual understanding of speech acts and preside over the regularity of the ways of speaking, below the possible variants due to various psychological and social factors: following this hypothesis, this is how speech genres are born” (my translation, J. G.). In the same vein, according to Bakhtin (1986[1952–53]: 79), one of those first scholars to have broadened genre analysis beyond the literary sphere, “if speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if we had to originate them during the speech process and construct each utterance at will for the first time, speech communication would be almost impossible”.

Accordingly, and in light of Peirce’s conception of Thirdness, we believe that discourse genres, considered here as a set of tacit instructions broadly constraining the form and content of utterances in given discursive practices, can be considered as Thirds, understood as real habits exerting an influence on our everyday discourse: if discourse genres do lack concrete existence (we cannot see them), they are nevertheless instantiated through particular (oral or written) linguistic productions, presiding over their formation. Bakhtin (1986[1952–53]: 80), again, suggested that:

[...] a speaker is given not only mandatory forms of the national language (lexical composition and grammatical structure), but also forms of utterances that are mandatory, that is, speech genres. [...] Speech genres are much more changeable, flexible, and plastic than language forms are, but they have a normative significance for the speaking individuum, and they are not created by him but are given to him. Therefore, the single utterance, with all its individuality and creativity, can in no way be regarded as a completely free combination of forms of language, as is supposed, for example, by Saussure (and by many other linguists after him) [...].

So, just as “the reality of words consists, according to Peirce, precisely in their relatively stable significations (the interpretative habits attached to words)” (Johansen 1993:
the reality of genres consists in the constraints they operate on the production of observable utterances, i.e. the productive habits they entail. Accordingly, the discursive regularities or patterns one can detect in collections of texts emanating from similar communication situations do highlight the relatively regulated, non-random nature of most of our discursive practices, epitomize the necessary constrained creativity of meaning-making and, more interestingly, confirm the influence of such discourse genres over-determining the content and form of utterances.

3. Discursive predictability?

Luckmann (2014[1985]: 352; my emphasis, J. G.) already considered that:

[…] there are indeed, in all societies, communicative actions in which participants do in fact, during the process of conception, orientate themselves towards an overall pattern as the means that serves their ends. This pattern largely determines the selection of different elements from the communicative ‘code’ and thus the progress of the action is, in terms of the elements determined by the pattern, relatively predictable. If such patterns are available and part of the social stock of knowledge, and if they are typically recognizable in concrete communicative actions, then we should speak of communicative genres.

If we come indeed to believe that discourse genres (or communicative genres in Luckmann’s terms), as habits pertaining to particular communication situations, regulate in one way or another our linguistic productions (as evinced by the regularities that can be detected in similar contexts), it entails that they could also theoretically be conceived as a determiner of observable predictions.

Obviously, one type of semiotic behaviour that can easily be observed might be one regulated by traffic codes. In this case, energetic interpretants – if one follows Peirce’s trichotomy of emotional, energetic and logical interpretants – can easily be empirically observed and statistically apprehended: such observations (technically speaking and according to Peirce’s categories, the observed material is composed of ‘sinsigns’, in all their empirical ‘haecceity’) can result in calculating the mean $x$ and standard deviation $z$ of the number of drivers who stop their car at a red light, who turn left when a sign forbids them doing so, who park in an appropriate place, etc. which can be used afterwards for future predictive modelling. Moreover, given the high social and physical costs implied by the traffic code as a sign system (e.g. the risk of a lethal accident if one breaks the rules, the fines incurred if one breaks the law, etc.), our semiotic behaviour has become so crystallized that one can rely on predictions enjoying a high probability of occurrence.
However, as far as discursive practices are concerned, observing and predicting which logical interpretants (e.g. symbolic signs) will exactly be generated in a given context is an outright impossible task. Firstly, observing and coding linguistic behaviour in real time is impractical: as conversation analysts know, one must necessarily rely on recording instruments or post hoc textual corpora in order to scrutinize any given material at a proper reflexive pace. Secondly, and more fundamentally, as man-made discourse-generic habits constraining discourse formation are context-dependent, they are not as firmly crystallized as natural laws pertaining to chemistry for instance, or as linguistic habits confining grammatical formation. As far as discourse is concerned, a total prediction is semiotically inconceivable since there is always room for dynamic creativity: we can consciously and individually unravel the habits relative to each particular contextualized setting that might be considered, as is most notably the case in special artistic contexts as well as in loose conversational ones. It is always possible, whether consciously or unconsciously, to “break the situational frame”, as Erving Goffman would say (see Goffman 1974, for instance), and go against the discourse-generic norms, which, needless to say, nevertheless entails problematic social consequences. Moreover, as Peirce also remarked, since “a prediction is essentially of a general nature, [it] cannot ever be completely fulfilled” (CP 1.26): we can only talk of a ‘disposition’ or a ‘tendency’ of future events to conform to a given general rule. This being said, making relative predictions regarding particular generic patterns linked to precise and highly formalized communication situations does not seem out of reach: after all, we all make unconscious predictions when interacting in a given social context. And, as we have suggested earlier, the discursive regularities emanating from corpora of compared texts belonging to similar communicative situations do point to more or less crystallized, situational habits that we suggested must have necessarily emerged in comparable contexts. Considered as a determiner of generic regularities (when it comes to repeated segments, expressions and syntactic structures, the use of clichéd and stereotypical constructions, etc.), the communication situation becomes a key factor to consider and determine if one wishes to predict patterned actualizations of a hypothesized genre.

According to Peirce, the role of purpose is seminal in every semiotic process because “semiosis occurs in a context, that context being one of purposefulness” (Short 2007: 158). Besides, “[m]any, if not all instances, of purposeful behaviour have dual bases: a general rule (instinct, habit, custom, thought) and an occasion for applying that rule” (Short 2007: 155). In our case, the communication situation is then considered as this “occasion for applying that rule” (i.e. a discourse genre) one postulates and expects to see being brought into play, always according to the communicative purposes at stake. In Peircean terms, we might say then that collateral observation and collateral experience of previous communication situations are thus required to trigger adequate
actualizations of context-specific genres; in those interpretative circumstances, abductive inferences are typically applied.

In the end, purpose-related discourse genres are fundamental for meaning-making processes because they control both the production and interpretation of the particular utterances they shape: recognizing those as belonging to specific genres direct the determination of final interpretants, understood as “stably formed habits that govern interpretations and actions within a given culture. [...] Final interpretants in this sense are vital to the survival of society, and to the sanity of individuals, because unless its members agree on the interpretation of a great many sign systems, society will disintegrate and eventually collapse, and if individuals are unable to form habits they go insane” (Johansen 1993: 341), no less.

4. A brief illustration

Like any other everyday life material, the online texts presenting universities instantiate a specific (promotional) “way of speaking”. In this case, the given communication situation is defined as a computer-mediated arrangement through which institutional writers, as a collective entity, propose to present and promote an academic institution as a whole to predefined publics (future students, actual students, personnel, researchers, potential donors, governmental actors, corporations, etc.) via the web. Consequently, according to the interpretative habits and the collateral experience of analogous past situations they have integrated, the addressees expect a particular discourse genre to be enacted and recognized, following which they will interpret and correctly comprehend the communicative purpose of those (mainly descriptive) texts. We suggested elsewhere that the particular discourse genre “associated with this type of online discursive activity – which concerns any organisation presented online, not only universities – can be paralleled with that of the paper promotional brochure presenting organisations; its numeric nature does not change the basic, generic characteristics present in traditional brochures” (Gaspard 2015: 559). Relying on a corpus comprising a selection of such texts, it is then possible to detect, describe and analyse the generic regularities that are invisible to single-text common readers, with the help of corpus linguistics automated tools.

An example of such generic regularities is the syntactic structure of a “prototypical” utterance, which has acquired a habitual use in this definite situation, besides being the support of fulfilling intrinsic grammatical functions. As such, the stereotyped form of those utterances are replicated by diverse university enunciators, from different horizons: accordingly, in Peircean terms, we might say that, as ‘dicent sinsigns’, they instantiate a particular expected and predictable ‘legisignic’ pattern. That is, in a typical conditional statement: if, as an utterer, I find myself in a communicative situation
whose purpose is the promotion of an academic institution, then I would have to say $a$, $b$ and $c$ in $x$, $y$ and $z$ ways, with the union of $\{a, b, c\}$ and $\{x, y, z\}$ being the predicted set of patterns emerging in all similar micro-situations. Such generic patterns include the overall use of the present tense (appropriate if one wishes to attribute existing and perennial features to an institution), of an impersonal style (as evidence of a constructed omniscient enunciator), of appositions (as descriptive pre-constructs of the subjects of numerous predications), of intrinsically positive adjectives (i.e. ‘strong’, ‘prestigious’, ‘best’, etc.), of enumerations and numbers (to synthesize and numerically characterize the features a university can be associated with), of additive prepositions and adverbs, etc.

Moreover, as far as the content is concerned, another type of regularity we found in the corpus is related to interdiscourses, understood as “the totality of discursive unities (belonging to previous discourses of a same speech genre, or to discourses contemporary to other speech genres, etc.) with which a particular discourse enters in an implicit or explicit relation” (Maingueneau 2009: 77; my translation, J. G.). A particular process of semiosis never begins ex nihilo; a sign at a $t$ period is always interpreted as a determined response to an antecedent sign produced at a $t-1$ period. This unlimited, intertwining semiotic chain is what enables mutual understanding to happen between two sets of utterances, often belonging to different discourse genres or distant texts, dispersed in the continuous flows of semioses in which we are embedded. In our case, we suggest that the use of ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’, very frequent in those texts, instantiate intertextual references with specific antecedent political discourses concerning higher education in Europe. Here are three exemplary utterances employing the ‘excellence’ expression (my translation and emphasis, J. G.):

(1) The University of Luxembourg (UL), as a small-sized institution with a global outreach, aims at excellence in research and education. (text of the University of Luxembourg)
(2) All curricula prepared at the University of Poitiers rely on a quest of excellence. (text of the University of Poitiers)
(3) Besides its interdisciplinary training curriculum and the excellence of its research, Paris Descartes University is characterized by the richness of its history and that of its heritage. (Text of Paris Descartes University)

The university websites from which the texts derive are those of the University of Luxembourg (http://wwwfr.uni.lu/universite/presentation/vision_mission/(language)/fre-FR), the University of Poitiers (archived at: http://composante-imedias.univ-poitiers.fr/la-diversite-et-la-qualite-des-formations-11349.kjsp?RH=1182255816372) and Paris Descartes University (https://www.univ-paris5.fr/UNIVERSITE/Le-patrimoine), respectively.
It can be suggested that those expressions, as elements of an isotopy of “competition”, making sense in a particular sociopolitical context in which a certain number of emerging practices in universities (e.g. evaluation of research and education, elaborate partnerships with other so-called prestigious institutions and enterprises, changing trends in teaching methods, internationalization of recruitment, etc.) bring about the promotion of a competitive state of affairs in academia: universities in the corpus aim to show they are the best in their domain, suggesting they have a (hypothetical) role to play on a “competitive” international stage. Overall, then, the overarching context, coupled with the communication situation bringing about those texts, generate a habitual use of specific expressions that are highly frequent in the corpus and part of an instantiated promotional genre: as such, they become predictable patterns highlighted by the discursivist.

5. The scientific relevance of contextualized predictabilities

Now, it is important to stress again that the potential discursive predictabilities concerned here do not apply universally but are logically context-dependent: community speakers generate meaning through (complexes of) signs that always correspond to localized semiotic constructs they have been taught or driven to compose by habitual grounded experience. As Wittgenstein (1953) would have said, the ‘forms of life’ giving rise to ‘language games’ (Sprachspiele) are above all innumerable and subject to constant reappraisal. With that in mind, highlighting such localized instances of Thirdness can only be relevant as far as it draws attention to the universality of the semiotic process underlying them: it would indeed be quite in vain to compile vast and often useless data of discursive regularities without questioning their phenomenological raison d’être or without linking them with the more abstract process that triadically unites a Sign to its Object and Interpretant. The quest for Thirdness, or generalities, should ultimately lead to the epistemological acknowledgement of the “predictive power of semiotics” (Bouissac 2010: 100).

Moreover, highlighting the habit-regulated instances in our social life draws attention to the logic of Peirce’s so-called synechism, understood as the conception following which “the universe of reality is […] a continuum” (Gilmore 2006: 311). As far as the symbolic sign is concerned, which is traditionally conceived as a man-made convention only, Nöth (2010: 84) points to the bridge Peirce’s synechism builds between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, traditionally viewed separately:

In contrast to [some] theories, which postulate that the symbol is the “essence of man” and of human culture (Cassirer), and which thus establish a strict separation, a semiotic threshold, between culture and nature according to the
presence or absence of symbols, Peirce's much broader perspective of the symbol as a sign guided by onto- and phylogenetic habit serves as a synecistic bridge to overcome two dualisms which have prevailed in the history of semiotics, the dualism of culture vs. nature and the dualism of the conventional vs. the innate, i.e., between human signs culturally transmitted by teaching and learning and signs genetically inherited and interpreted by instinctive dispositions. Against the dualism culture vs. nature, Peirce proposes that the habit by which symbols are interpreted is conventional or natural. Against the dualism of the conventional vs. the innate, Peirce postulates that the habit which determines the symbol is an “acquired or inborn” disposition.

In Peirce's mind, the habitual triadic process involved thus overarches ‘culture’ as well as ‘nature’ in a synecistic fashion: as Nöth (2010: 92) claims, “the habit that determines a symbol to function as a sign may be acquired or inborn, but the habit as such is a phenomenon of nature” (my emphasis, J. G.). In this perspective, any localized analysis of Thirdness should be regarded as a testimony to the unity that Peirce's philosophy ensures for both natural and human scientific inquiries, whose aim is:

[...] to transcend the perception of existent things and to see things, to understand things, in terms of their relations to one another in a kind of field. What you are understanding is not things in terms of the mechanical principles of action/reaction, but the more general tendencies of things, the dispositions of things to interact in specific ways within a specific context. (Gilmore 2006: 312)

In our case, the particular “things” Gilmore refers to would be our discursive utterances as they are embedded “within a specific context”: they can indeed be apprehended as “things” or Seconds, understood as particulars in all their observable concreteness. In this endeavour to understanding “the general tendencies” of our discourses however, we semioticians need the global insight of philosophers – among whom Peirce is the most revered one – who can theoretically articulate, ground and make sense of the phenomenological foundation of our objects of study. As far as discourse is concerned, see for instance Bergman 2009 and his work on the underlying rhetorical aspects of Peirce's theory of signs.

**Conclusion**

In this article, we wished to recall that a relative predictability of discursive patterns was theoretically and implicitly envisaged by Peirce's paradigmatic conception of the nature of semiosis: the regularities one can detect in corpora of carefully chosen texts belonging to similar communication situations – or “forms of life” – point to semiotic habits evincing actualized Thirdness, according to Peirce's terminology. Every
communication situation generates learnt semiotic constraints over-determining our individual discourse. If those generic constraints are not as crystallized as those regulating grammatical constructs, they nevertheless influence some general pertinent aspects of the formation of utterances. It follows that we could theoretically (and relatively) predict the actualization of probable detectable syntagms, but for contextualized settings only. However, considering the infinite heterogeneity of semiotic habits just one small community can produce, it would be in vain to try to describe the discursive patterns of all the semio-linguistic material that social actors leave behind. Nevertheless, the localized studies of those patterns would point to the crucial fact that semiotics, as a practice highlighting how the Real can have instantiated existence through meaning-making material (whether iconic, symbolic, etc.), is also a science of the real – in the most commonsensical, materialist sense of the term.

References


Жанры дискурса как определители дискурсивных последовательностей: случай семиотической предсказуемости?

В статье изучаются дискурсивные последовательности, которые можно наблюдать в корпусах текстов, основанных на сходных ситуациях коммуникации (медицинские интервью, политические дебаты, обучение и т.д.). Один тип такой последовательности связывают с так называемыми «жанрами дискурса», которые рассматриваются как инструкции, обрамляющие форму высказываний в данной дискурсивной практике. Эти последовательности выдвигают на первый план относительно отрегулированную, неслучайную природу большинства наших дискурсивных практик и характеризуют неизбежную ограниченность творческого потенциала значения в дискурсе. Мы полагаем, что пирсовские понятия первичности и привычки (habit) могут оказаться полезными при описании роли и важности таких последовательностей в социодискурсивной жизни. Более того – мы верим, что дискурсивные последовательности являются идеальным материалом при изучении предсказуемости в семиотических (дискурсивных) процессах. Их изучение может быть одним из многих исследовательских направлений, где могла бы быть применена основанная на предсказуемости научная концепция семиотики.

Diskursusežanrid kui diskursiivsete korrapärasuste kindlaksmääravad: kas semiootilise ennustatavuse juhtum?