Symptom without transcendental syntax

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Abstract. This paper aims at investigating the Freudian symptom as an individual anti-language involved in a semiotic antagonism towards the internal logonomic system. In Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, the symptom is interpreted according to transcendental and atemporal principles. Leaving aside these principles, we argue for a social semiotic approach in which the meaning of symptom is determined by its antagonistic relationship to the logonomic system, and also by its converted link with the repressed object in a specific socio-cultural context. The symptomatic antagonism is marked by a hypocritical and ambivalent relationship with the logonomic system and the repressed entity. The duplicitous semiosis of the symptom refers to rhetorical transformations made to reach a compromise between the contradictory poles of the law and the forbidden phenomenon. As regards the relation of the symptom to subjectivity, the symptom emerges as a conjuncture in which the subject of statement is related to the subject of speaking in a conflicting way. Accordingly, the former as the replica of a legisign-subjectivity is related symptomatically to the latter as a mere sinsign not preceded by any ideological subjectivity. The symptom is like a hinge on which the opposing doors, namely consciousness and unconsciousness, turn. Finally, the case of Little Hans will be analysed proceeding from the antagonistic aspects of symptom.

Keywords: Symptom, subjectivity, anti-language, social semiotics, Little Hans

1. Introduction

The symptom is considered to be a compulsive, automatic, and non-arbitrary sign with a natural link between its signifier and signified (Sebeok 1999: 46). Taking into account the natural and causal motivations behind symptomatic signification,
Peirce (1953) considers the symptom as a subcategory of indexical signs. It should be noted, however, that the symptom as a semiotic object cannot be reduced to the category of indexical signs marked by linear cause-and-effect chains (see Uexküll 1986: 205–6). Far from being a mere physiological object, the symptom may emerge as a phenomenon conditioned by socio-cultural discourses; as a result a fixed and atemporal signification, or a direct corporeal causality between its signifier and signified may not be assumed (see Staiano-Ross 2012). Freud was the first to go beyond physiological causality as regards symptom interpretation, and considered the symptom as a symbolic and rhetorical message (Quintavalle 2002: 46). The Freudian symptom, that is, the symptom analysed in the psychoanalytic discourse, is an umbrella term which covers different phenomena such as slips of the tongue, involuntary behaviours, dreams, etc. They are not explained in terms of mere physiological causality, but read in terms of the intersubjective and symbolic history of the patient. Hysterical blindness exemplifies the Freudian symptom. Although it seems to be a corporeal disorder, it is rooted in the non-physiological and intersubjective experiences of the person (Freud, Breuer 1996; Freud 2010: 22–25). Freud (e.g. 1914, 2002, 2010) explored various kinds of symptoms. They emerge from the repression related to cultural and ethical considerations. The symptom as a sign is a substitute for a repressed object (Freud 1926: 91). Being a substitute, the meaning of the symptom is always somewhere else, that is to say, it cannot be interpreted by itself, but should be related to another sign to acquire its meaning. The second sign is the repressed object related to the symptom metaphorically or metonymically. Using some rhetorical and figurative transformations including displacement and condensation, the symptom replaces the repressed object which cannot be expressed according to ethical rules (see Freud 2010). The rhetorical transformations give rise to the mysterious message of the symptom. By disguising illegal desires, it lets them be expressed indirectly. By applying structural linguistics, Lacan (2006a) tries to define the symptom and its rhetorical transformations in terms of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. Consequently, the rhetorical metamorphoses of the symptom have been explained as metaphor and metonymy.

But the question is why the symptom occurs, and why the symptom represents its repressed object in a converted way? Freud (2001) and Lacan (2006b) explain the symptomatic events in the light of some atemporal and transcendental principles including the Oedipus complex, castration anxiety, and desire for incest. Regarding Freudian psychoanalysis, it seems that these principles are transhistorical and transcendental. Freud believed that they are true for every society and every time. Symptoms can be interpreted by being relegated to the Oedipal principles. If we take these unvarying principles as a universal and eternal syntax, it can be argued that violating one of the rules results in an ungrammatical and problematic sentence,
Symptom without transcendental syntax

namely the symptom. Considering Freudian psychoanalysis, human beings have a core syntax which produces normal and grammatical structures, that is to say normal personalities. Accordingly, symptomatic behaviours are seen as a kind of aphasia. Neurosis and psychosis are two kinds of psychological aphasia that have violated the rules of Freudian syntax.

Whenever a patient refers to a psychoanalyst, s/he asks the analyst to interpret her/his symptoms according to the atemporal and universal syntax of psychoanalytic ideology. As Uexküll (1986: 215) puts it, the only thing (in the symptom) that is accessible to the observer (physician or analyst) is the physical sign carriers, namely the signifiers without the signifieds. Also Barthes (1972) argues that the symptom achieves its meaning when it is read in the light of a certain medical discourse. This is because the symptom emerges as a pure signifier. So it can be argued that the Freudian syntax provides the signified (interpretation) for the symptom as a pure signifier. The agency of discourses in symptom interpretation refers to the semiotic nature of the symptom. Emerging as pure signifiers, symptoms seek their meaning by addressing the big Other (Žižek 2008: 79). Regarding the heterogeneity of society (or the big Other), different discourses may supply different meanings for a certain symptom. Freudian transcendental syntax as one of the different possible discourses pretends to be universal and atemporal, but it has faced many criticisms regarding its claims about universality and neutrality. For example, Hodge and Kress (1988) criticize Freud’s atemporal and transhistorical approach in analysing Oedipus the King. Proceeding from social semiotics, they read this text in terms of socio-historical antagonism. Also Deleuze and Guattari (2000) condemn the familial basis and lack of historicity of Freudian psychoanalysis. They highlight the political and social struggle behind the Oedipal myth. Likewise, Jacques Derrida (1981) believes that Freudian psychoanalysis suffers from phallogocentrism as the heritage of old tradition of metaphysics and patriarchy. Also, the feminist movement casts doubt on the universalism of psychoanalysis because of the great impact of patriarchy on it, and because of ignoring the female agency in the genesis of psyche (e.g. de Beauvoir 1956; Irigaray 1983a, 1983b; Kristeva 1984). Furthermore, it should be noted that medical anthropology rejects the notion of the universal symptom, and presents the idea of local biologies (e.g. Lock, Kaufert 2001; Lock, Nguyen 2010; Lock 2013). Considering the criticisms, it can be argued that they have mostly been directed at the atemporal and universal aspects of Freudian Psychoanalysis. The transcendental Freudian syntax is not justified in interpreting the symptoms. This fundamental syntax is the metaphysical moment of the psychoanalytic treatment. Regarding the present era in which meta-narratives (see Lyotard 1984) have been challenged to a considerable extent, the universal principles and the atemporal syntax for symptom interpretation are inconceivable.
Friedrich Nietzsche was the first to recognize the relevance of any static syntax to the theological-metaphysical tradition. His famous sentence “I am afraid we cannot get rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (Nietzsche 2005[1889]: 170) demonstrates this point clearly. It means that any static and universal principles bring about a metaphysics that promotes a contingent discourse into the position of a universal and eternal one. After Nietzsche, many scholars have denied the static and universal grammar. For example, Hopper (1998) rejects the myth of rule-based grammar. He presents an emergent grammar which is dependent on a specific socio-temporal discourse. In the same manner, the concept of the rule is replaced by that of tendency (toward a prototypical construction) in cognitive grammar (see Langacker 2008, 2009). Accordingly, grammar is made by subjective construal depending on a contingent socio-physical context. Denying any sort of rule-based grammar, Tabakowska (1993) believes that linguistics and stylistics are the same, in other words, they are bound to find alternatives and differences without any underlying rules. The end of meta-narrations and the absence of a universal syntax seem to be related to the absence of any universal syntax for the psyche.

Taking into account the absence of an atemporal and principled syntax, how can the symptom as a sign be interpreted? Without Freudian-Lacanian atemporal principles such as the Oedipus complex, and the name of father, it seems that the faint line between the symptom as a converted sign and other kinds of signs fades away. If there is no Freudian universal syntax, how can we speak about the psychoanalytic symptom? This paper tries to answer these questions. It aims at investigating and explaining the Freudian symptom (the psychoanalytic symptoms and not the pure physiological symptoms in biomedical discourse) as a sign within a symbolic antagonism conditioned by socio-ideological context. Firstly, I discuss the relevance of ideology to signs, and then consider the social determinations of symptom.

2. Symptom as an individual anti-language

Although Saussure (1915) distinguishes parole from langue, and defines langue as the main object of linguistic inquiry, he acknowledges the social basis of language, and considers language as a social fact. However, Voloshinov (1973) denies the artificial distinction between langue and parole, and considers linguistics and semiotics to be a branch of the study of society and ideology. He considers sign as something loaded with ideological meanings. Accordingly, langue as an abstract system cannot be separated from its social foundations. Also, he casts doubt on the homogeneity and unitary character of language and semiotic systems, and regards them as something full of variations and antagonism. In the same manner, Halliday (1978)
emphasizes the social basis of language, and categorizes linguistics as a subfield of social semiotics. Consequently, these theoretical backgrounds give rise to social semiotics (e.g. Hodge, Kress 1988; Van Leeuwen 2005). From the point of view of social semiotics, signs are not isolated and abstract entities, but are dependent on their socio-ideological contexts. They are determined by some regulative principles (logonomic system) derived from socio-ideological positions. The logonomic system as a set of ideological principles determines the production and interpretation of signs. It can be argued that each sign is derived from a logonomic perspective, and is laden with ideological meanings. In case of a conflict among different ideologies, linguistic and semiotic struggles come into existence (see Fairclough 1989; Hodge, Kress 1988). Accordingly, the semiotic sphere and the homogeneous langue are decomposed into many antagonistic ideological accents. It should be noted that the dominant discourse tries to suppress other discourses and create a fake homogeneity. Every contradiction or opposition to the dominant logonomic system faces resistance or violent reaction from the dominant discourse. It should be mentioned, however, that the other oppressed discourses try to challenge the dominant semiotic order by anti-languages. The subordinates create anti-language to challenge the dominant semiotic style (see Halliday 1978; Hodge, Kress 1988: 87). Then, each discourse challenging the dominant logonomic order can be considered as an anti-language. Accordingly, the anti-language embodies the semiotic struggle within the semiotic communities.

Taking into account the undeniable social basis of signs, the symptom cannot be isolated from socio-ideological foundations. It should also be considered within the heterogeneous and antagonistic semiotic community. For this purpose, let us review the Freudian definition of the symptom in detail. The symptom as a sign is a substitute for the repressed desires and phenomena which are unethical and illegal. This repression is done by ego at the behest of superego (Freud 1926: 91). The ego and superego represent the rational-ethical ideology of the society. It can be argued that the ego and superego are the internalized logonomic system. Consequently, they try to regulate the circulation of thoughts, desires, etc. As a result, psychological repression is done by the internalized logonomic system. For escaping from the repression and censorship imposed by the internal logonomic system, the symptom paves the way to satisfying the illegal desires in a converted and indirect manner. This transformed satisfaction, however, is achieved via rhetorical transformations (displacement and condensation). Then, the substituted sign, namely the symptom, is related in a figurative way to the repressed object to challenge the dominant logonomic order. As far as the challenging of the internal logonomic system by the symptom is considered, we can call the symptom a specific anti-language made by an individual in order to resist the dominant logonomic system. Also, because it belongs to a person and not a
social group, we can call it an individual anti-language. It can be argued that this individual discourse may fade away after a while, or take the form of a social discourse by reproducing itself in the social sphere.

Symptomatic semiosis cannot be reduced to a mere opposition to the logonomic order, because it adapts its superficial properties to the logonomic norms. There is always a complicated dialogue between the symptom and the dominant logonomic system. On the one hand, the symptom challenges the logonomic order which is manifested as a continuous interpellation of the superego; on the other hand, it carries out the challenging indirectly via some rhetorical transformations to adapt itself to the logonomic system. The identity of the symptom cannot be separated from its betrayed addressee, namely, the internal logonomic system. To sum up, the symptom as a rhetorical transformation relates two contradictory phenomena with each other. It links the repressed entity to the conventional semiotic order by rhetorical strategies.

The relationship between the symptom and the logonomic system is full of antagonism and heterogeneity. It means that the symptom, while adapting itself to the semiotic order of the logonomic system, tries to escape its limitations, and challenge the monophony of the dominant discourse. To explain this point, let us consider the symptom of forgetting the intentions. Freud (1914: 159) refers to a soldier who dares not defy the military rules. The soldier cannot tell his commander: “I hate to obey your disgusting orders” for he will be severely punished. But by forgetting them unconsciously, he can justify his disrespect for military orders. Using this symptom, he can escape the punishment by the logonomic order of the military system, and also satisfy his desire to disobey the orders. Accordingly, forgetting as symptomatic behaviour tries to satisfy the repressed desires and escape from being punished by the logonomic system. In this case, the symptom is in an antagonistic relationship with the dominant discourse. Considering the antagonistic relation of the symptom to ideological discourses, the main role of the symptom is providing a way of getting rid of the limitations imposed by the logonomic system. But this antagonism and challenges are made possible via some rhetorical transformations in order to adapt symptoms to the semiotic norms of the logonomic system. As concerns the case of the forgetful soldier, it can be argued that ignoring the orders challenges the military system, but this challenging is made possible only by selecting forgetting instead of disobeying. Disobeying is replaced by forgetting in order to make the disrespect more compatible with the logonomic system of the military institution. In other words, forgetting the orders is not considered as breaking the law. Then, there is a triadic relationship between the symptom, the logonomic system, and the repressed desire. The symptom does not express its repressed object directly, but denotes it in a figurative and ironic way. Consequently, the symptom has a contradictory nature: on
the one hand, it is related to an illegal phenomenon, namely the repressed entity; on the other hand, it adjusts the repressed entity’s appearance to the semiotic norms of the logonomic system by some rhetorical transformations.

Then, the symptom has hypocritical relations with the logonomic system and the repressed desires. The concurrent relations to the contradictory poles bring about discordant rhetorical constructing of the symptom. In order to clarify the contradictory message of the symptom, let us consider the fetish as a symptom. The fetish as a sign is a metaphoric or a metonymic substitute for a hideous object (Sebeok 1999: 123). It replaces the hideous object with a less dangerous thing. The substitute is related to the repressed object metaphorically or metonymically. For example, the fetish of a high-heeled shoe as a metonymy for a feminine body, or the fetish of a long object as a metaphor for the phallus have replaced the dangerous objects with other objects. The fetish wants to be related to the repressed object in an indirect way, and also tries to adapt itself to the logonomic order by using a harmless object. Accordingly, fetish like other symptomatic phenomena has a contradictory relationship to ethical-legal restrictions and repressed wishes. These discordant relations make the most prominent aspect of symptomatic discourse, and also distinguish it from other simple anti-languages. The mysterious message of symptom refers back to this ambivalent attitude to the repressed object and the logonomic regulations.

Therefore, it is not necessary to relegate the symptom to the transcendental Freudian principles for interpreting it. By considering the dialectical relationship of the symptom to the logonomic system and the suppressed phenomena, we can interpret symptoms. This dialectical relation is determined by a symbolic antagonism within a socio-ideological situation.

To sum up, the symptom as a rhetorical transformation relates two contradictory phenomena with each other. It links the repressed entity to the conventional semiotic order by rhetorical strategies. As a result, the symptom as a specific anti-language challenges the established semiotic order by expressing the repressed entity, but it also preserves its relation to the logonomic system via rhetorical transformations. These concurrent relations are constrained by socio-cultural conditions. To investigate the symptom as a socio-cultural entity instead of it being preceded by transcendental principles, it is necessary to define culture as an immanent entity. In other words, culture should be regarded as a historical and changeable phenomenon, and not as ruled by transhistorical and transcendental principles. In the next section, I shall try to present an immanent analysis of culture and explain its relevance to the symptom.
3. Totem, taboo, and the symptom

In Totem and Taboo Freud (2001[1913]) presents a pseudo-mythical narrative in which some boys kill their father, and lie with their mothers. After these traumatic events, they regret committing these acts. After that, a memorial sign for the father is built by the boys, and a law passed which strictly forbids incest. The memorial sign and the law are embodied by the totem and the taboo respectively. The totem is the distinctive symbol for the tribe, and the taboo exemplifies the tribe's rules and regulations. This myth is used to illustrate the agency of some transcendental principles including the Oedipus complex, the desire for incest, and the unique role of the father in shaping the human personality. This imaginary story is taken by Freud as a universal and transhistorical foundation of human civilization and culture. The main principles of Freudian syntax are extracted from it. It is evident that this story is full of patriarchal themes: the active role of fathers and boys, and the passive role of mothers and girls. What is important in this story is not the Freudian clichés such as the Oedipal events and the traumatic roots of culture, the most important point is the agency of a privileged sign, namely the totem, in producing culture and law. If we disregard Oedipal clichés and the remorse from which the boys suffer, the most important moment in this story is the semiotic genesis of culture by the totem as a specific sign. The totem as a super-signifier gives rise to a necessary foundation for a certain semiotic order. Accordingly, culture can be considered as an output of semiosis without there being any preceding Oedipal principles. The totem as the super-signifier and the taboo as the legal restrictions and regulations represent the logonomic system for socio-cultural systems. Accordingly, to explain the genesis of a culture, it is not necessary to presuppose any atemporal principles. The genesis of culture can be explained by semiotic activity which brings about a certain logonomic system in a socio-cultural context. It means that the sign itself is the main factor which should be regarded as the immanent reason for the genesis of culture. Accordingly, culture as an immanent semiotic entity relies upon semiotic activity and not on transcendental and eternal rules. It is not necessary to presuppose a transcendental condition behind the sign of the totem, as it may have different contents in different socio-historical conditions. Thus, every culture can have different totems and taboos, that is to say different logonomic systems. It should be mentioned that each semiotic order is bound to its socio-cultural context; so there are no universal and eternal logonomeric systems nor universal totems and taboos.

Considering the immanence of culture, the question arises concerning the relationship between the symptom and the logonomic system as embodied by the totem and the taboo. It can be argued that each symptom can be interpreted and produced according to its underlying symbolic discourse. In other words, the totemic structure
is like a reference point according to which the symptom is interpreted. But the symptom has a mysterious relation to its reference point. As mentioned above, the symptom as a substitute tries to satisfy the repressed desire, but it accomplishes this work by rhetorical transformations to escape the censorship imposed by the dominant logonomic system. The concurrent contradictory relations of symptom to the totemic structure (the logonomic system) and the repressed object make its interpretation possible. This means that when the symptom and its dialectical relationship to culture as a semiotic entity are considered together, the meaning of the symptom becomes clearer. This dialectical relation is conditioned by the socio-cultural situation in a specific era.

However, still another question can be posed: why do symptoms occur for individuals in a culture? Regarding the question, the relevance of the social subjects to the symptom should be illustrated. As is the case with social subjects, discourses also try to reproduce their desired ideological subjects. They produce the subjectivity that is compatible with their logonomic systems. They accomplish this aim by the procedure of interpellation. Interpellation is a process by which ideology transforms individuals into subjects, namely, a subjective position determined by ideological and discursive meanings and functions. By interpellating the subjects, ideology offers them an ideological position and identity (see Althusser 1971). As a result, the subjects are produced according to the order of the logonomic system. Failed interpellation results in the emergence of subjects that are surplus to the dominant logonomic system. In other words, when the dominant ideology cannot produce its desired subjects, and also does not regulate them successfully, subjects emerge that challenge the logonomic order. Consequently, the surplus subjectivity challenges the conventional semiotic order of the dominant discourse. As mentioned in the previous section, the symptom is a kind of anti-language; accordingly, it can be argued that the symptom occurs in those subjects who are not overwhelmed by the interpellation of the dominant logonomic system. For example, a neurotic subject obsessed by illegal and unethical motivations is not completely overcome by the dominant ethical discourse. Consequently, s/he produces symptoms in order to preserve her/his relationship to the suppressed entity, but s/he does such a work in a figurative way to adapt her/his rhetoric to the symbolic norms. Therefore, the symptomatic subject has a complicated relation to the law and the suppressed entity. In the next section, I shall investigate subjectification and its relation to the symptom in more detail.
4. Subject and symptom

Benveniste (1973a: 224) considers subjectification as a by-product of communicative discourse: “It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the concept of ego in reality.” Indexical pronouns like ‘you’ and ‘I’ generate subjectivity. By applying the pronouns the participants become subjects of a specific discourse (Benveniste 1973b: 220). In addition, because of the dependence of the indices on each other, subjectivity is a relational and dependent entity:

Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as I. (Benveniste 1973a: 224–5)

Accordingly, subjectivity is firstly a linguistic product, and then it is a relational entity, because I and you cannot be imagined without each other. The most important point in Benveniste’s approach is that subjectivity is explained immanently according to its underlying discourse. No transcendental and atemporal principle is used to explain subjectification. The second important point is that subjectivity is not an autonomous and independent entity, but a relational and differential phenomenon. In this regard, the concept of split subjectivity is presented. It refers to the splitness and conflict between the subject of statement which is represented and reproduced by the discourse, and the subject of speaking who is the agent of speaking without being represented verbally in the discourse (Benveniste 1973a). This dual subjectivity produces what is called the splitness of subjectivity which is highlighted by the psychoanalytic school.

Lacan (2006c: 650) considers the subject of statement as actualized in the pronoun I as the ego or consciousness. But the subject of speaking is regarded as the subject of the unconscious. It emerges through our speech, but cannot be equated with I or the subject of statement. The subject of statement belongs to the realm of meaning, ego, and consciousness, and that of speaking belongs to the sphere of being and unconsciousness (Fink 1995: 42–6). Accordingly, the ego and the superego as the representatives of the logonomic system belong to the category of the subject of statement as represented and reproduced by the discourse, while the repressed, unconscious and unrepresented subjectivity which is excluded from the discourse belongs to the category of subject of speaking.

As mentioned above, each discourse or ideology tries to reproduce its desired subjectivity by the procedure of interpellation, and the symptomatic subjectivity
Symptom without transcendental syntax

is the result of failed interpellanation. Therefore, it can be argued that the subject of statement as reproduced subjectivity is produced by the logonomic system in a specific context, and the subject of speaking as the excluded unconscious subjectivity is the repressed subject who expresses herself/himself through some converted signs, namely symptoms. By producing a special symptomatic anti-language the suppressed subject escapes the censorship imposed by the dominant discourse, and expresses itself in a disguised way to be compatible with the logonomic system. The main attribute of the subject of statement is being reproduced according to the ideological cliché of subjectivity, but the subject of speaking emerges as something unique and unanticipated that is not conventional and normal. It seems that the symptom as a linkage between the law and the repressed relates these two kinds of subjectivities. In order to explain these points let us consider two terms by Peirce. Peirce (1998: 142–3) distinguishes between three kinds of signs, namely the qualisign, the sinsign and the legisign. The distinction between the second and the third signs is important here. The sinsign is an actual thing or event, while the legisign is a general type which has been agreed upon by the participants in a communicative society. The legisign can be actualized in different contexts. It can be compared to a phoneme which has many allophones in different phonetic contexts. Each of the manifestations of a conventional legisign is called the replica. Peirce believes that each replica is itself a sinsign, that is to say an actual and concrete sign. Each replica is preceded by a conventional legisign:

The replica of a legisign is sinsign. Thus, every legisign requires sinsigns. But these are not ordinary sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the replica be significant if it were not for the law which renders it so. (Peirce 1998: 143)

Thus, the legisign reproduces itself through many replicas in different contexts. It should be noted, however, that there are sinsigns which are not replicas. It means that they are not preceded by a legisign agreed upon by participants in the semiotic community. For example an event or a thing not belonging to the semiotic order can present itself as a sign and attract our attention. The replica is the reproduced form of a conventional legisign, but pure sinsigns are unique and unconventional. For example, a common noun like ‘orange’ is a legisign which can be reproduced by many replicas in different contexts, but a ‘spontaneous cry’ in a desert is a sinsign. The latter is not articulated according to a conventional semiotic order. It emerges as an actual and sudden event not belonging to meaningful semiotic conventions.

Considering these two signs, it can be argued that the reproduced and represented subjectivity in the discourse (subject of statement) is a replica of the desired subjectivity produced by a logonomic system. The legisign-subjectivity by reproducing
itself in different contexts creates many replicas, namely its contextualized versions. Also it seems that the repressed subjectivity as something excluded from the discourse and conventional types of subjectivity is the mere sinsign of subjectivity not preceded by any conventional form. Thus, it is unique and unconventional. It emerges through a symptomatic rhetoric employed to escape censorship imposed by the logonomic system. In other words, it expresses itself via an alienated discourse (from its own repressed reality) to be consistent with the logonomic order. As mentioned above, the symptom relates the logonomic system to the repressed entity via rhetorical transformations. In the same manner, the symptom as a linkage brings two contradictory subjectivities together. Consequently, by drawing on the rhetorical transformation the repressed subjectivity links itself to the realm of conventional forms of subjectivities. By disguising itself as the formal clichés of subjectivity, it may be allowed to participate in the communicative discourse in a converted way. It seems that the symptom is like a hinge around which contradictory poles including the law and the repressed, the subject of statement and the subject of speaking turn. This capability of the symptom refers to its rhetorical procedures, including metaphor, metonymy, projection, transference, etc.

5. Little Hans and his stubborn castrators

In this section, I am going to discuss a Freudian case, namely, Little Hans (see, Freud 2000a: 157–276), according to the antagonistic aspects of symptom. Little Hans is one of the cases analysed by Freud indirectly. By reporting the daily life of Hans to Freud, Hans’ father exercised psychoanalytic procedures on Hans on behalf of Freud. Union of the institutions of family and psychoanalysis against the infantile semiotic world is evident in this case. The emergence of the unconventional semiotic world of Hans faces the aggressive reactions of Freud and Hans’ father at the prompting of the dominant logonomic system. Hans’ symptoms try to make a compromise between these two conflicting worlds: the infantile world of Hans and the paternal world of Freud and Hans’ father. They include a synthetic rhetorical construction to forge a compromise between the infantile and the paternal discourses.

At the beginning of the narration, Hans is continuously asking questions about the sexual organs of his parents, himself, and others. He also masturbates, and cannot curb his curiosity about sexual matters. He is accused of desires for patricide and incest, and is represented as a little Oedipus (see Freud 200a: 236). His mother threatens him with castration, and blames him for his hideous questions. His father wants to convince him that his ideas about sexual matters are abnormal and pathological. In order to analyse the case, Freud continuously refers to his transcendental principles including the Oedipus complex, desires for patricide and incest. It seems
that after the process of Freudian treatment, Hans is cured by accepting the castration complex. In the final parts of the narration, Hans pretends to surrender himself to the logonomic system of his father and Freud.

The focal problem in this case is the symptomatic phobia of Hans according to which Hans fears going out because he thinks that a horse may bite him. Freud (2000a: 261) believes that Hans’ phobia makes a compromise between his desire to remain at home with his mother and his fear of being punished by his father. The hybrid nature of the phobia is evident here. Firstly, it is for escaping from being punished by the father as the paternal representative of the logonomic system, and secondly, it is there to satisfy his desire for his mother indirectly through his justified remaining with the mother. This phobia makes a compromise between both of his fear of the father and his love for the mother.

The other symptomatic phenomena in this case have the same function of forging a compromise between the contradictory poles. As an example, let us consider the symptomatic figure of the horse. In the early parts of the narration, the figure seems to be a substitute for the mother, but as the narration continues, it acquires some new visual properties which lead Freud to think that the horse can be a substitute for the father. In the first parts of the story, Freud and Hans’ father are convinced that it is a substitute for the mother (Freud 2000a: 218), and in the final parts, they conclude that it may be a substitute for the father (Freud 2000a: 258). This is because Hans firstly describes the horse in relation to the repressed object, namely his mother, but finally he speaks about something black around the muzzle of the horse which is like a moustache. Accordingly, the horse has a polysemous character that can simultaneously represent the repressed object of desire (mother) and the paternal figure of the logonomic system. It seems that the horse as a prototypical case of symptom involves two contradictory parts including the seductive maternal object and the paternal figure of law.

But the question is between which discourses do the symptomatic phenomena make a compromise? It seems that the symptoms create a compromise and linkage between the infantile discourse of Little Hans (the unconventional and repressed discourse) and the dominant discourse of Hans’ father and Freud. It can be argued that Hans as a subject is marked by a specific discourse which challenges the logonomic system. Freud does not speak about the infantile discourse of Hans, and continuously refers to Oedipal clichés to explain the function of the symptoms, but I am going to show that Little Hans has a specific unconventional semiotic discourse that faces an aggressive reaction from Freud and Hans’ father, and the symptoms try to make a linkage between the conflicting discourses. I leave aside the Freudian clichés, and try to present the infantile discourse of Hans.

It seems that the unconventional discourse of Hans cannot be reduced to Freudian principles. This discourse arises as a result of a specific categorization. Hans’
discourse categorizes entities according to two distinctive features including {having or not having genitals} and {the size (long and short) of genitals}. The unconventional categorization shapes the infantile discourse of Hans which Freud and Hans’ father try to remove. According to this kind of categorization, humans and animals (like the horse and the giraffe) belong to the category of having genitals, and chairs and desks belong to the category of not having genitals. It should be noted that Hans sometimes faces some borderline cases. For example, when he sees a machine from which water is dropping, he enquires where the genital organ of this machine is (see Freud 2000a: 160). Also, he sub-categorizes entities according to the size of their sexual organs; accordingly, the mother, father, horses, and giraffes are categorized as having long genitals, but Hans’ little sister, and her doll belong to the subcategory of having short genitals (see Freud 2000a: 164). It is worth mentioning that the male and female distinction is not important in Hans’ categorization. The pseudo-homosexual behaviours of Hans should be interpreted in the light of this specific categorization. Accordingly, all the animate beings having genitals can be possible sexual partners. It can be argued that Hans is not a homosexual, but is a kind of pan-sexual. The other important point in his discourse is that Hans considers females as having bodies with genitals and not as imperfect bodies envying the male genitals. But Hans’ father and Freud continuously try to convince him that women are lacking genitals, and represent them as incomplete bodies (see Freud 2000a: 176). Not only do Hans’ father and Freud represent women as castrated humans, but they also threaten Hans by their castrating ideology. They insistently try to separate entities and humans according to their sexual and epistemological ideology. One of Hans’ fantasy shows the violent separation brought about by the ideology of Freud and Hans’ father clearly:

In the night there was a big giraffe in the room and a crumpled one; and the big one called out because I took the crumpled one away from it. Then it stopped calling out; and then I sat on top of the crumpled one. (Freud 2000a: 183)

As always, Freud says that this story refers to a scene of copulation seen by Hans. The important point in the scene is not copulation, but the painful separation of the big giraffe from the little crumpled one. The giraffes let out a cry expressing their strong emotions about the separation. The ideology of separation and castration has been manifested in this infantile fantasy. But who are the big giraffe and the little crumpled one? It can be argued that the big giraffe is the mother (like the big horse in the first parts of the narration) and the little crumpled one is Little Hans. When Little Hans sits on the little crumpled giraffe, he wants to indicate that the two signs are in a paradigmatic relation. In other words, in this case they can be substituted, consequently, they are the same. Then, this narration may be a symbolic representation of
separating Hans from his mother and his infantile world, and in the same manner separating Hans and women from their genitals and bodies. It seems that this fantasy represents the castrating ideology of Freud and Hans’ father. This ideology tries to separate the entities and illegal combinations according to its sexual logonomic system. Also, it tries to castrate women and children, and represents women as incomplete bodies whose genitals have been removed. They continuously threaten to remove the genitals of Hans, and to separate him from his mother and friends. Freud and Hans’ father consider Hans’ discourse as abnormal and pathological, and try to regulate it in order to assimilate Hans’ discourse into the conventional order.

The subjectivity brought about by Hans’ unconventional discourse is in contrast with the desired subjectivity of the familial ideology. Hans’ infantile subjectivity is the output of his underlying unconventional categorization. His sexual personality and his ontological divisions of the world do not correspond to the ontological order of the dominant logonomic system. His conceptions of women, familial relationships, and his pansexual tendency may not be tolerated by the patriarchal ideology of his father and Freud. Accordingly, his infantile subjectivity is not the reproduced subjectivity of the clichéd and ideological subjectivity (legisign). This abnormal and unique subjectivity seems to be a pure sinsign not preceded by any legisign. The familial ideology of subjectivity and sexuality as incarnated in Freud and Hans’ father persistently seeks to regulate Hans’ abnormal subjectivity. Hans’ symptomatic behaviours try to create a compromise between two subjectivities belonging to conflicting discourses, namely the infantile discourse of Hans and the dominant familial discourse. As Freud puts it, the phobia provides such a compromise (Freud 2000a: 269). The phobia as a symptomatic behaviour helps Hans to manage the contradiction between the incompatible discourses. The phobia shows the contradictory relation of Hans to his own discourse and the dominant familial discourse. In the same manner, the symptomatic figure of the horse represents this ambivalent attitude. In the first parts, the image represents the seductive figure of the mother, and then represents the aggressive and dangerous paternal figure of law. The horse is the most prototypical case of the symptom.

Now let us review Hans’ last fantasy: “The plumber came; and first he took away my behind with a pair of pincers, and then gave me another, and then the same with my widdler” (Freud 2000a: 237). Freud interprets this story as an indicator of an acquired castration complex. As a result, by telling this story, Hans wants to show that he has left his unconventional sexual discourse, and has accepted the familial logonomic system of sexuality and subjectivity. The first genitals (anus and phallus) taken away by the plumber belong to the infantile sexual discourse of Hans, and the second ones given to him by the plumber belong to the dominant sexual discourse. Freud interprets this narration as the sign of the success of psychoanalysis in
regulating Hans’ abnormal discourse. But in spite of Freud's optimism, it should be noted that we can regard this fantasy as another misinterpreted symptom. It seems that this story as a symptom is meant to deceive Hans’ father and Freud as representatives of the dominant logonomic system. In one of his psychoanalytical analyses, Freud (2000b: 294–5) refers to the lie of the dream. In this case, he analyses a lesbian girl who is under pressure to leave her abnormal tendencies. She suddenly starts to dream about marriage and having a child. Accordingly, Freud thinks that she has acquired heterosexual tendencies. Yet he recognizes that her dreams resemble lies told to deceive her family and psychoanalyst in order to get rid of their stubborn interpellations. Consequently, the very symptomatic nature of the dream transforms it into a message antagonistic toward the psychoanalyst's logonomic system. The dream should not be considered as a container that includes some truth about the patient; it may, however, be an anti-language which is wisely decorated in order to deceive the psychoanalyst. In a similar manner, it seems that the last Hans's fantasy is a symptomatic message for deceiving the representatives of the dominant logonomic system (Freud and father) to get rid of their insistent interpellation.

6. Conclusion

This paper tried to explain the symptom as conditioned by the socio-ideological context from a social semiotic perspective. The symptom as a converted sign is related to its repressed object via rhetorical transformations, namely metaphor and metonymy. It expresses its meaning in a figurative way to escape the censorship from the logonomic system. The symptom, the repressed phenomenon, and the logonomic system do not have atemporal and universal contents, but they are determined by discursive antagonism in a certain socio-historical context. The symptom as an anti-language challenges the semiotic order of the dominant discourse, but it should be noted that its approach to the logonomic system is hypocritical, because on the one hand, it is related to a hideous and unethical object, and on the other hand, it adapts its rhetoric to the logonomic system. This ambivalent aspect of the symptom makes it a specific anti-language. The symptom is a paradoxical phenomenon in which the contradictory poles approach each other in a discordant discourse. Thus, it is where the subject of speaking links itself to the subject of statement. This relationship is made possible via rhetorical transformations. The dialectical relationship of the symptom to the law and the repressed object can bring about its interpretation. This interpretation is done without any transcendental principles and universal essentialism. Accordingly, the symbolic antagonism of the symptom towards the logonomic system may be explained immanently. In other words, no transcendental syntax is needed to interpret the symptom.
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References


Симптом без трансцендентального синтаксиса

Цель статьи – изучение симптома Фрейда как индивидуального антиязыка, который вовлечен в семиотический антагонизм посредством внутренней логonoмической системы. В психоанализе фрейдистско-лакановского толка симптом трактуется исходя из трансцендентальных и атепморальных принципов. Мы предлагаем социосемиотический подход, где значение симптома определяется его антианагонистическим отношением к логonoмической системе, а также связью симптома с репрессируемым объектом в определенном социокультурном контексте. Двойственный семиозис симптома указывает на риторические трансформации, проводимые для достижения компромисса между противоречивыми полюсами закона и подавленного энтитета. Что касается соотношения симптома с субъективностью, то симптом проявляется как соединение, где субъект аргумента находится в конфликте с субъектом речи. Таким образом, первый как реплика субъективности общего знака (legisign-subjectivity) симптоматично связан со вторым как простым единичным знаком (sign), которому не предшествует никакая идеологическая субъективность. Симптом – это как дверная петля, на которой двигаются противоположные двери (сознательное и бессознательное). В конце статьи анализируется случай Маленького Ганса как пример антагонистических аспектов симптома.

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