Abstract. This paper discusses Juri Lotman’s concept of autocommunication and explores its applicability by referring to Roland Barthes’s representations of Self and Other. The texts to be discussed include Barthes’s writings on Japan and China, an excerpt from his rewriting of Balzac’s “Sarrasine” in S/Z, and his autobiography and Rousseau’s Confessions. The paper contrasts two cultural communication cases in terms of analysing two kinds of a-semantic codes: (1) the positive a-semantic code of Japan, and (2) the negative a-semantic code of China. With reference to “Sarrasine” and S/Z, the paper discusses two specific codes, cultural memory and imagination, which lead to the addressee’s reformulations. Finally, the paper examines how different modes of autocommunication are put into practice in Barthes’s autobiographical and Rousseau’s confessional writings.

Keywords: Juri Lotman, Roland Barthes, autocommunication, Self, Other, Japan, China

1. Introduction: Why Lotman and Barthes?

As Juri Lotman says in the conclusion to his book Universe of the Mind, “[W]e are both a planet in the intellectual galaxy, and the image of its universum” (Lotman 2001: 273), all human activity possesses a certain unity, and no mechanism can enable any individual sign systems to work in isolation. This poses the question on the autonomy, integrity and self-sufficiency of a cultural system, and therefore our task is to identify and tackle the gaps within a cultural system and those existing between several cultural
systems. Lotman’s semiotic study of culture shows such an attempt at bridging the gaps within a culture and between cultures. It furnishes, among other things, a set of signification procedures consisting of two layers, namely, natural languages as the primary modelling system, and culture as the secondary modelling system. Coupled with this logic of signification is his communication model.

In the general language-based semiotic framework, Lotman is found congenial with his French counterpart Roland Barthes, who applies a linguistics-informed semiology to the analyses of all kinds of cultural phenomena and explores into the territory of cross-cultural studies. It is on the basis of parallelism in theoretical speculations and applications that I will bring into rapport the Lotmanian communication model and the Barthesian praxis of *écriture* on Self and Other.

Owing to the language barrier, I shall confine myself to the English translations of Juri Lotman’s writings. I shall compare, in particular, the three available essays on I-s/he communication and autocommunication. The first essay is Juri Lotman’s “Two models of communication”, which appeared in an anthology edited and translated by Daniel P. Lucid, *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology*. According to Lucid’s footnote to this essay, this paper was originally entitled “О двух моделях коммуникаций и их соотношений в общей системе культуры” [On two models of communication and their correlation in the general system of culture], and it was published in 1970 in Тезисы докладов IV Летней Школы по вторичным моделирующим системам 17–24 августа 1970 [Theses of the reports at the Fourth Summer School on Secondary Modelling Systems: 17–24 August 1970] (Lucid 1977: 99). The second essay, with a title of “Autocommunication: ‘I’ and ‘other’ as addressees”, is included in the book *Universe of the Mind* (1990). The third essay with the short title “‘I’ and ‘I’” appears in the book *Culture and Explosion*. The publication history described above is based on Kalevi Kull’s 2011 article on the bibliography of Juri Lotman’s works in English (Kull 2011: 343–356).

2. Re-articulating the Lotmanian communication model

The immediate concern of this paper is a recapitulation of Juri Lotman’s concepts of the two communication models. In the case of I-s/he communication, information known to the addresser and unknown to the addressee is transmitted in space (Lotman 1990: 21); in other words, there is the spatial gap between addressee and addressee (Lotman 1977: 99). This kind of communication is characterized by one-way information flow, where the code remains unchanged and, theoretically speaking, the stability of code warrants the message’s unmistakable transmission, though in reality the message fails to be fully transmitted (Lotman 1990: 21–22). This kind of communication is oriented towards information provision, and serves mainly communicative and mnemonic...
Juri Lotman’s autocommunication model and Roland Barthes’s representations

functions (Lotman 1977: 100, 1990: 21). Since it is subject to the syntactical and grammatical rules, it is less creative and productive. The morphology of this I-s/he communication has been shown in Fig. 1.

According to Lotman’s own remarks, the difference between I-s/he communication and autocommunication lies in the latter’s manifesting of the “replacement of the spatial gap between addresser and addressee by a temporal gap” (Lotman 1977: 99). Actually, autocommunication also suggests a two-way flow of information, which is transmitted in time from the addresser to himself/herself – one that knows it already, while the variation of code turns texts, i.e., encoded messages, into metatexts (Lotman 1977: 101), thus causing an increase in information, and reformulating the addressee (Lotman 1990: 22). In other words, autocommunication is oriented towards the reception of code (Lotman 1977: 100) rather than the reception of information, and it is also oriented towards reflexive comments on the code. Under such circumstances, the creative function rather than the communicative and mnemonic functions becomes autocommunication’s priority. Autocommunication also helps to evoke the sense of “self-existence, self-discovery and auto-psychotherapy” (Lotman 1990: 29). Generation of this kind of communication is beyond the syntax and grammar, thus it is more psychological, latent and unlimited. The present author has noticed two models on autocommunication given by Lotman in different periods that differ slightly from each other. One model (Fig. 2) is found in Lucid’s endnote to Lotman’s paper “Two models of communication”. It goes as follows (Lucid 1977: 101):

According to Lucid, this model was taken from Lotman’s paper “О двух моделях коммуникаций в системе культуры” [On two models of communication in the system of culture], and it was published in 1973 in Труды по знаковым системам, IV
By differentiating between I-s/he communication and I-I communication, Lotman is able to transform Jakobson’s speech-based model (cf. Jakobson 1960: 350–377) into a cultural-mechanism-based model, which has more extensive applicability. But how does Lotman succeed in doing this? In the present author’s opinion, Lotman principally sets nonverbal communication and inter-semiotic communication as research objects, and deals with culture-based texts, which are more complex than verbal texts. In cultural mechanisms, communication is carried out via at least two channels, of which Jakobson’s communication model is only one, which Lotman re-terms as “I-s/he communication”, one-way flow of information. Lotman reveals two-way flow of information, which he terms “I-I communication”, or “autocommunication”, and he views the feedback loop in transmission of information as a space for the addresser’s [addressee’s] reflexive thinking. The decrease and increase of information happen in a space which is latent and psychological, rather than manifest and subject to grammatical constraints; and this situation, in Lotman’s view, is an issue of creativity while the failure in information transmission becomes a secondary matter. To Lotman, I-s/he communication primarily serves the function of information provision, while autocommunication comments reflexively on code, and discusses the transmission of information beyond the scope of pure code. Thus, autocommunication is a model mainly for cultural texts’ creative function and intertextuality within cultural space. Autocommunication also explains how cultural information serves the function of infinite “self-fashioning”. It can also account for inter-cultural communication and understanding.

Figure 3. Lotman’s model of autocommunication in 1990.
3. Applications of Lotman’s communication model

Since Lotman’s communication model is highly abstract and irreducible, it raises the problem of applicability, especially when there is a huge leap from verbal text to cultural text. To testify its applicability, one should notice the differences between dealing with communication models and dealing with concrete communication cases. One of the most characteristic differences is that in real communication cases every duplication of I-s/he communication gives rise to a special type of communication, which includes I-I communication, no matter whether in verbal or nonverbal/cultural communication. In this case, when addressee 1 becomes a new addressee 2, the encoded message 1 is changed by new codes, then the changed message 1 acts on addressee 1, so that addressee 1 is reformulated into addressee 2. In other words, a message is received and interpreted by the addressee, and, more often than not, it exerts an impact on him/her. The impact becomes a new code, which takes part in the activity of the addressee’s original coding space, and finally leads to his/her reformulation. The more a-semantic the code is, the better it leads to the addressee’s reformulations. This is shown in Fig. 4:

In case of the duplication of I-s/he communication, the function of a-semantic code and the ways in which it functions are worth noticing, because the orientation towards code receiving or towards information receiving determines the effect of cultural dialogue, and affects the future development of a certain culture. A simple
differentiation of two kinds of codes should be made between the positive a-semantic code and the negative a-semantic code; while the former paves the way for an open space of the addressee's reformulation, the latter works in a contrary way. In the next section, the author would like to discuss Barthes's representations of Japan and China in terms of the aforementioned communication models.

### 3.1 The positive a-semantic code and Barthes's representation of Japan

I would like to give Barthes's representation of Japan as an example to discuss the positive a-semantic code. In 1966–1967, Barthes visited Japan three times; besides cultural visits, he organized a seminar on “Structural Narrative Analysis” at the Institut Franco-Japonais de Tokyo. After this trip, Barthes wrote the popular book *L’empire des signes* [*Empire of Signs*]. At the very beginning of this book, Barthes claims that in no way was he representing or analysing the reality of Japan, that he was not gazing at the Oriental Essence, and that he was by no means following the major gestures of Western discourse on Japan (Barthes 1982: 3). On the contrary, he was aiming to “isolate somewhere in the world (faraway) a certain number of features (a term employed in linguistics), and out of these features deliberately form a system” (Barthes 1982: 3). It is this system which Barthes shall call “Japan”, a system that is characterized by “invented interplay” (Barthes 1982: 3) and affords him a situation of writing, so as to allow him to gain an experience of entertaining a new understanding of Sign. There is no doubt that the coding system of Japan is heterogeneous to Barthes’s epistemology. The heterogeneity manifests itself as already textualized, and the textualized Japan inspires Barthes to launch a special reading of heterogeneity which is more code-oriented than information-oriented, because from Barthes's point of view, Japan as a sign-system is self-referential and auto-referential, and the way in which it operates instigates the Westerner's code-oriented reading.

However, one cannot afford to ignore the fact that Barthes is capable of reading Japan in an information-receiving way. Barthes once seriously studied Japanese because he wanted to master the structure of this language so that he could understand the intellectual structure of the language and the sensibility reflected therein (Barthes 2002b[1969]: 113). In other words, the heterogeneous coding system of Japan rather than the essence of Japan as an oriental country makes Barthes's dream of a galaxy of *signifiants* come true. In an interview, Barthes talks about three kinds of Japanese films he has watched: the first kind comprises imitations of Western techniques; the second kind fully represents traditional Japanese culture, with feudal themes; and the third kind is non-informational, with no subtitles, but has a profound esthetic appeal (Barthes 2002a[1968]: 84). As an example of positive a-semantic code, the last kind of film interests Barthes most, because it stimulates the expression rather than the content of thought, and forces its addressee to be reformulated. Indeed, Barthes's
reading strategy of Japan adopts a kind of positive a-semantic code, which comes into being as an impulse to change his intellectual universe, and finally makes him a practitioner of writings for a pluralized addressee. In other words, Barthes's writing provides his addressee with code-oriented reading rather than information-oriented reading. Barthes reads “l’empire des signes” as “l’empire des signifiants” rather than “l’empire des signifiés”. As subject (le moi), Barthes's reading of and writing about Japan (l’autre) presents the typical characteristics of autocommunication and self-reflexive thinking, in which the code-oriented reading of the Other transforms the addressee into the addressee, and effects the reformulation of the addressee (adresser) via writing.

3.2 China as a text of “assentiment” and a negative code

Differently from the “jouissance”-embodied representation of Japan, Barthes’s representation of China focuses on the latter as a receivable but non-interpretable text and a negative code. It was during China's Cultural Revolution, from 11th April to 4th May 1974, that Barthes, François Wahl and members of the Tel Quel group, including Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva and Marcelin Pleynet, visited China. Barthes arrived in Beijing on April 12th, and wrote in his diary a short sentence “Alors, la Chine…” (Barthes 2009: 21). Then a short essay with this title followed and was published on 24th May, 1974, in the newspaper Le Monde. Wahl's serial essays entitled “La Chine, sans utopie” [China, without utopia] were published in the same newspaper on 15th -19th June. A special issue of Tel Quel entitled “En Chine” drew a lot of attention in that year, and Kristeva's book Des Chinoises later became a part of the feminist canon. But quite unlike the other people in this delegation, Barthes showed only little interest in making use of this trip in his writing; besides a few fragments in Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes and Le neutre in which we found Barthes's distance from “China”; he thought about publishing his diary without any amendments, in an Antonioni style (Herschberg Pierrot 2009: 9). However, it is not difficult to find out the main reasons why Barthes had no desire to write about China. Evidence from Carnets du Voyage en Chine, the finally published Antonioni-style diary of Barthes's visit to China, tells us that this trip was closely planned and accompanied by personnel from the Chinese government, and free visits were not permitted. Barthes later claimed that the whole voyage is behind two show-windows: la langue and l’agence (Barthes 2009: 168). In addition to the Chinese organizers’ performance that accounts for Barthes's loss of desire in writing about China, Barthes’s own persistent detachment from politics and ideology also affects his representation of China.

The China of 1974 is a place where for Barthes no sexual desire could be aroused and no motivation for writing could be triggered – a milieu which Barthes describes as “fadeur” (“insipidity”). According to “Alors, la Chine…”, China's opaque semantic field with heterogeneous coding system is not susceptible to interpretation, so China
appears chaotic to the Western mind. For people like Barthes, who do not have a body which “accommodate[s] itself to generality” (Barthes 1977: 175) and to the banality of politics, China closes its semantic field to this unique body, the anti-banality writer. Besides, in Barthes's opinion, China should not be interpreted by a certain discourse with linguistic repetition and ideological preference; instead, he would like to use the word “assentiment” (“assent”) to describe China.

In Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, we read:

Much later (1974), on the occasion of a trip to China, he tried to use this word assent again, to explain to the readers of Le Monde – in other words, of his world – that he was not ‘choosing’ China (too much was missing for him to shed light on such a choice) but acquiescing in silence (which he called ‘insipidity’), like Vinaver's soldier, to what was under way in that country. This was not understood at all: what the intellectual public wants is a choice: one was to come out of China like a bull crashing out of the toril in the crowded arena: furious or triumphant. (Barthes 1977: 48)

Barthes's reaction to the negative responses to his 1974 essay “Alors, la Chine…” may help us to understand the word assentiment better; he writes: “[T]his text conditionally poses to us a primary question: not ‘Is it what is permitted?’ but ‘Is it what is possible to say?’” (Barthes 1975: 13; my translation, L.H.). Using an analogous word no comment to replace assentiment, Barthes explained: “For China, the immense object and, for most people, the blurry object, I attempt to produce – this is my truth – a discourse that should not be assertive, or negative, or neutral: a commentary that would be: no comment: assent (the mode of language which belongs to an ethics and maybe to an aesthetics), and it is not necessarily an approval or a refusal (modes which belong to a reason/ratio or to a belief)” (Barthes 1975: 13–14; my translation, L.H.).

Assentiment is a humble position held by the reader of a foreign culture (non-culture), a compromise made with la langue of a foreign sociolecte, a response to “no answer” from a “disorganized” semantic field, and a refusal to the improper discourse uttered by the Other (while the Other supposes itself as a hermeneutic subject). Barthes’s notion of assentiment also casts light on the communication between different cultures. We propose that culture A sends text X to culture B, while B doesn’t share the same cultural space of codes with A. Rather than decoding text X according to B’s own cultural space of codes, B accepts X’s existence, but does not assimilate it into its cultural semiosphere. If culture B realizes that it has the desire, need, power or ability to assimilate X into its culture, X will be acceptable either as a code, or a message, or both. And X will move from the peripheral space of B’s intellectual sphere to its core. In Zen Buddhist terminology, we can say that X is capable of arising B’s “epiphany” (dunwu, 顿悟).
3.3 The positive and negative a-semantic codes

In the two afore-mentioned examples, Barthes’s representations of Japan and China lay out the importance of analysing the positive and the negative a-semantic codes. As an example of the positive kind, the Japanese films with aesthetic appeal escalate the addressee’s reformulation by serving as an intruding code to evoke the entertainment feeling and the desire of writing, while as an example of the negative kind, the textualized China of 1974 defies interpretation by closing its semantic field to the touch of an outside perspective. Furthermore, coding specificities often undermine successful communication, such as the addressee’s conative inclination and his or her epistemological system, both of which also account for the addressee’s reception of certain codes. In the case of Barthes, for example, powerful politics never appeal to him, while the aesthetics of the “fragile and delicate” attracts him immensely.

4. How cultural memory and imagination work as new codes?

After discussing the difference between the two a-semantic codes, I would like to turn to Barthes’s reading of an episode in Balzac’s novella “Sarrasine” to show another aspect of autocommunication. This episode concerns Sarrasine’s representation of (la) Zambinella’s body, and it helps to explain how cultural memory and imagination effect the addressee’s reformulations.

Sarrasine was instigated by somebody to watch an opera in Italy, where he met the mysterious soprano Zambinella. After this show, he went back to his workshop and made sketches of the soprano, but his representation on canvas went far beyond mimesis:

On one page, La Zambinella appeared in that apparently calm and cool pose favored by Raphael, Giorgione, and every great painter. (Barthes 1974: 121)

Sarrasine sketched his mistress in every pose: he drew her unveiled, seated, standing, lying down, chaste or amorous, embodying through the delirium of his pencils every capricious notion that can enter our heads when we think intently about a mistress. (Barthes 1974: 121)

However, his fevered thoughts went beyond drawing. (Barthes 1974: 121)

He saw La Zambinella, spoke to her, beseeched her, he passed a thousand years of life and happiness with her by placing her in every imaginable position. (Barthes 1974: 123)

Sarrasine’s recall of la Zambinella demonstrates an individual’s short-term memory, which should be the clearest and most stable memory. However, when it is represented by the artist’s sketches, la Zambinella appears in Raphael’s and other masters’ favourite poses. Obviously, Sarrasine was following these great painters so closely that his
cultural memory was reflected in his sketches of an object perceived quite recently. Thus, (la) Zambinella’s image came into Sarrasine’s mind as a particular perception and was processed immediately by cultural memory; when it was represented again, both its content and form became different from the original. We may say that individual memory resides within cultural memory and is reflected by the cultural scene; it has its base in the individual’s epistemological system, but it is mediated, constrained, interrupted and supplemented by cultural memory. Thus, individual memory appears to be a “déjà vu” (and “déjà lu”) text characterized by “mise-en-abîme”, a mirror reflecting countless mirrors.

Accompanied by cultural memory’s mediation of individual experience, imagination also functions as another key code to evoke autocommunication. According to Barthes’s reinterpretation of this story in his book *S/Z*, Sarrasine’s drawings are hallucinatory. Hallucination is “a scenario in which the object’s positions are innumerable (‘every imaginable situation’) but always related, as in voluptuous manipulation, to the subject, who is at the center of the scene (‘he saw, he spoke, beseeched, passed’)” (Barthes 1974: 123). Sarrasine’s imagination of (la) Zambinella with an unusual gesture or copying the poses favoured by Raphael and other painters, in fact, is to fantasize and manipulate a desired body, as Barthes observes: “Following the realist notion of art, all painting can be defined as an enormous gallery of hallucinatory manipulation – wherein one does with bodies as one wants, so that gradually they fill every compartment of desire (which is what happens bluntly, that is, exemplarily, in Sade’s *tableaux vivants.*)” (Barthes 1974: 121). The interesting point is, however, that it is the object’s silence that moves the observer’s marvellous imagination forward. In interlocution, I-s/he communication usually marks itself as a moment of silence to the allocutor (Chang forthcoming), in which the encoded message reformulates the allocator and pushes him/her to making a response; thus autocommunication is included, while in intercultural or nonverbal communication, the moment of silence provides a special impulse which is partly responsible to the addressee’s imagination. Since (la) Zambinella’s response never arrived, what Sarrasine could do was to keep revising his drawing of (la) Zambinella: in the process of this non-stop self-correcting, the addresser conveys to the addressee an image of himself, and his narcissistic discourse focuses on the intrusion of new codes rather than on the message.

From the perspective of imagology, the observing subject’s imagination of the observed object is a mirror, which has the mysterious power to reflect the general culture within which the observing subject is immersed. With recourse to the mediate function of art, Sarrasine not only represents a pluralized object’s images, but also self-reflexively reconstructs himself. As the most remarkable intruding codes in Sarrasine’s autocommunication (drawing), cultural memory and imagination help to evoke the addresser’s unconscious desire of “self-fashioning”. Parallel to the autonomous auto-
referentiality of signifiants in a post-structuralist perspective, autocommunication appeals to any poetic texts for its signifiants-oriented operation of reading and writing.

5. Two modes of autocommunication

In this final section, I shall briefly discuss two modes of autocommunication represented by Barthes's post-structuralist autobiographical and Rousseau's confessional writings.

In the essay entitled “‘I’ and ‘I’”, Lotman (2004: 147) cites Rousseau's Confessions to show the tension between ‘I’ as pronoun and ‘I’ as a proper name. The carrier of truth in this work is the singular ‘I’ and a proper name. This makes Confessions an echo to autobiology, an hors-texte (Chang 1986: 285–286). Confessions has a high orientation towards the position of the addressee, thus its axiological hierarchy values ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’, the addressee possesses a more valuable and intelligible position than the addressee, and the latter models on the addressee. According to Lotman, Confessions is a typical example of autocommunication, which serves the function of obtaining the “sense of self-existence”, operating “self-discovery and self-psychotherapy” (Lotman 1990: 29).

Against the classic system of authenticity revealed by Rousseau, Barthes experiments with an autobiographical writing without reference to his autobiology. “I do not try to restore myself...I do not say: ‘I’m going to describe myself’ but: ‘I am writing a text, and I call it R. B’...I am the story which happens to me”, “T[his] book is not a book of ‘Confession’... What I write about myself is never the last word... my texts are disjointed... the latter is nothing but a further text... text upon text, which never illuminates anything” (Barthes 1977: 120). As a pronoun, ‘I’ could be replaced by ‘you’ or ‘he’, ‘my’ autobiography has no reference to ‘my’ autobiography. In this sense, Barthes's autobiographical writing is the forgetting of ‘self’ and deconstruction of autobiography. Instead of constructing the nostalgic memory or biography of a biological past, the post-structural autobiographical writing practices a new discourse. Readers cipher rather than decipher this kind of discourse, and reading amounts to autocommunication. Both the writer and the reader are reformulated in self-addressing. When ‘I’ is a pronoun rather than a proper name, autobiography ceases to function as the writer's autocommunication only, but shifts to the reader's autocommunication. The historical independence of autobiography is deconstructed by autobiography, the mnemonic and communicative functions of autocommunicative texts are reduced, while the creative and meta-critical functions are highlighted, making autobiography an open, creative text.

Barthes's fragmentary writing consists of a galaxy of signifiants, and a galaxy without a centre: “I spread myself around: my whole little universe in crumbs; at the center, what?” (Barthes 1977: 93). This kind of writing also represents the continuous
intrusions of codes, which prolong the appearance of a final conclusion, and thus prolong the “plaisir” of “écrire” and “lire”. Barthes’s autobiography is oriented towards the addressees and a pluralized axiology. It works as a catalyst to the reader’s reflexivity.

Thus, we have two modes of autocommunication. One mode involves a singular addressee and it is oriented towards autocommunication within a closed space, and it serves the function of evoking the sense of individual self-existence, self-discovery and self-psychotherapy. The other mode is enacted by a pluralized addressee and it is oriented towards autocommunication within an open space, which functions as the evocation of the pleasure of reading for pluralized readership. Obviously, the readership in the latter case contains reading of a foreign culture.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, our analysis shows that Lotman’s communication model is highly abstract and irreducible, and its applications have to untangle a complex networking of modes of communication of cultural texts. Nevertheless, autocommunication is capable of ensuring the cultural texts’ infinite self-proliferation, and its dual mode has the advantage of exposing a cultural phenomenon’s inner heteroglossia. Finally, the communication model sheds light on Human’s awareness of the uniqueness of a specific culture, and the universum of cultures. It also stimulates the human desire to create and his capability of individual and social self-reformulation.1

References


1 The author gratefully acknowledges the learned comments of the anonymous reviewer. The author has followed his/her suggestion to change the title from “Juri Lotman’s communication model and Roland Barthes’s representations of Self and Other” to “Juri Lotman’s autocommunication model and Roland Barthes’s representations of Self and Other”.
Juri Lotman's autocommunication model and Roland Barthes's representations

(1) Autocommunication: Negative influence and cross-cultural studies. Paper delivered at the 2013 Tartu Summer School of Semiotics, 22nd August 2013.


Модель автокоммуникации Юрия Лотмана и репрезентации Себя и Другого у Ролана Барта

В статье рассматривается понятие автокоммуникации Юрия Лотмана и изучаются возможности его применения при анализе репрезентации Себя и Другого у Ролана Барта. В качестве материала для анализа взяты тексты Барта о Японии и Китае, книга „S/Z“, автобиография Барта и «Исповедь» Руссо. Автор статьи противопоставляет два случая культурной коммуникации, основанные на двух видах асемантических кодов: (1) японский положительный асемантический код; (2) китайский негативный асемантический код. На примере «Sarrasine» Бальзака и «S/Z» Барта рассматриваются два специфических кода, культурная память и воображение, которые приводят к преобразованию адресата. Автор статьи описывает применение разных приемов автокоммуникации в автобиографиях Барта и Руссо.

Juri Lotmani autokommunikatsiooni mõdel ning Ise ja Teise representatsioonid Roland Barthes’il