The two pragmatisms in the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev

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Abstract. This article focuses on the views held by the early Bulgarian representative and interpreter of pragmatism Ivan Sarailiev (1887–1969) on the two trends of this doctrine – the method for ascertaining meaning proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce, and the theory of truth propounded by William James. Sarailiev applied and propagated the pragmatist ideas of the doctrine’s founders in Bulgaria in the 1920s, and is thus one of the first followers of Peirce in Europe and the very first in Eastern Europe. How deep was Sarailiev’s understanding of the two types of pragmatism? How did they shape his philosophy and what was their role? This article will try to address these questions as well as presenting the overall reception of pragmatism in Bulgaria in the Interwar period through Sarailiev who was its only serious proponent both at the time and long afterwards.

Keywords: Ivan Sarailiev, pragmatism, Charles Peirce, William James, Bulgaria.

One of the general features of pragmatism is the opposition method for ascertaining meaning vs. theory of truth, or Peirce vs. James, which is an indispensable part of every survey of this doctrine, and is sometimes even chosen as a title (see Mounce 1997). This split of pragmatism was further intensified by the work of the followers of the doctrine who – joining one of these two traditions, and continuing their studies in the direction preliminarily set by it – actually pushed the two trends further apart.

The division of pragmatism is reflected in an unusual manner in the philosophy of the early Bulgarian follower and interpreter of the doctrine, Ivan Sarailiev, as both trends have their own place and play a specific role in his philosophy. This article will
try to prove the proposition that while it was mostly the pragmatism of James that Sarailiev presented to the general public, his own philosophical views were closer to the ideas of Peirce. Let us start by saying a few words about this remarkable yet still almost unknown Bulgarian scholar.

The revived thought

A few years ago the name and work of the Bulgarian philosopher Ivan Sarailiev was resuscitated. Sarailiev’s name had been condemned to a half-century of silence by the communist regime. Then suddenly this brilliant thinker reappeared as though out of the blue. Professor Ivan Mladenov, who rediscovered Ivan Sarailiev, wrote of him: “Had he written in an internationally recognized language, Professor Ivan Sarailiev would have largely been celebrated as a prodigious and eminent thinker […]” (Mladenov 2002: 282).

Ivan Sarailiev was born in Sofia in 1887. In 1909 he graduated from Paris Sorbonne University summa cum laude in philosophy. One of his mentors at the Sorbonne was the famous scholar Henri Bergson. After his graduation Sarailiev spent a year in Oxford and London perfecting his English and continuing his education. There he met some well-known philosophers, among them Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, one of the prominent pragmatists in Europe. Sarailiev was in intensive correspondence with both Bergson and Schiller. These letters are now part of Ivan Sarailiev’s archive which contains also his diaries and a large number of documents that serve as important evidence for the scholar’s life and work.

Between 1916 and 1918 Sarailiev served as a press attaché first in Germany and then in Switzerland where he continued his philosophical training, attending the University of Berlin and the University of Bern. He was one of the very few Bulgarian scholars familiar with the three main philosophical traditions: the French, the Anglo-Saxon and the German. While the majority of Bulgarian philosophers after World War I followed the German Classical tradition, Ivan Sarailiev favored the Anglo-Saxon one. He spent the year 1924 in Great Britain, followed by two years (1931–1932) in the USA as a Rockefeller grantee. He studied pragmatism extensively and purposefully collected materials for his own future study entitled Pragmatism. Names that are worth noting among the many renowned professors Sarailiev met during his visits to various American universities, are John Dewey and William Pepperel Montague – two of the very few students of Peirce.

Although Sarailiev wrote almost exclusively in Bulgarian, he was fluent in Greek, Latin, French, English, German and Russian. For thirty years (1920–1950), Sarailiev taught history of philosophy at Sofia University. The long list of his courses included
The two pragmatisms in the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev

pragmatism and contemporary American thought from the very beginning. In 1935 he founded and presided over the Philosophy Club in Sofia, which was created in semblance to the Metaphysical Club, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that gave birth to the name and doctrine of pragmatism in the early 1870s. Ivan Sarailiev’s prestige was recognized outside the borders of Bulgaria, too. He maintained contacts with his contemporary fellow philosophers, and took part in all major international conferences and congresses.

Sarailiev’s work includes a number of articles and essays, as well as seven books, among them General Ideas (written in 1916 and published in 1919 because of World War I), On the Will (published in 1920, second expanded edition in 1924), Contemporary Science and Religion (1931), Pragmatism (1938a, reprinted in 2002) and Socrates (1947). He also translated Principles of Human Knowledge by George Berkeley into Bulgarian. This book was published in 1914. Through his lectures and publications Sarailiev introduced the ideas of Bergson and pragmatism in Bulgaria.

His book Pragmatism (1938a) deserves special attention. This is a remarkable book in many respects. It is the first presentation of the pragmatic doctrine in Eastern Europe. The book that consists of essays on the greatest pragmatists, such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, is well written and readable. The introduction presents the reception of the doctrine in England, France, Germany and Italy, and the appendix offers a survey of the history of the terms “pragmatism”, “pragmatical”, and “pragmaticism” and is followed by twenty pages of annotated bibliography. We will return to this book later when examining the question of the role the two pragmatisms played in the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev.

When the communist regime took power in 1944, Sarailiev’s career came to a violent halt. The new authority saw him as a bourgeois philosopher and a representative of the Western capitalist doctrines of Bergsonism and pragmatism. In June 1946 he was elected president of Sofia University, but because of his refusal to cooperate with the communist authorities, he was compelled to resign some months later. The new governing body of Sofia University offered him the following deal: if he should accept the views held by the Communist Party and start teaching Marxism-Leninism, he would not be fired in the impending political purge of the professors (CSA, 192). However, being committed to the advantages of pragmatism, the philosopher steadfastly declined this offer and remained true to his views. In 1950, after a new series of attempts to break his will and “affiliate” him with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the totalitarian power set its repressive machine in motion with the aim of removing him. Sarailiev was forced to retire and was banned from further publishing. Any access to his previous publications was prohibited and his name was classified. He was saved from the labour camps only as a result of the
respect his work commanded even among the communists (see Bankov 1945: 126). The authorities forbade his students from visiting him, but he was awarded a consolation prize: every morning he found a bunch of fresh flowers left by his students at the doorstep of his house (Apostolova 2004: 23). Ivan Sarailiev died peacefully, but in total obscurity and isolation, in Sofia in 1969.

The pragmatism of William James in the works of Ivan Sarailiev

Sarailiev devoted most of his lectures on pragmatism and contemporary American thought at Sofia University to William James. The talk he gave at the Philosophy Club on January 31, 1936 was entitled “Pragmatism and truth”. As the title clearly demonstrates, it was devoted to the pragmatist theory of James. What is more, in 1921 Sarailiev invited one of James’ most energetic followers, the above-mentioned British pragmatist Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, to give a series of lectures on pragmatism in Sofia. Although the visit did not in fact take place, the invitation itself is significant. It is an indication that Sarailiev wanted to present to the Bulgarian scholarly community, above all, the pragmatism of James.

This trend is illustrated also by Sarailiev’s publications devoted to the newly formed doctrine. It is true that his book Pragmatism starts with the essay “Charles Peirce and his principle”. However, it is followed by a logical transition: “Pragmatism is not simply a method for clarifying ideas, it is a theory of truth. Pragmatism is gaining recognition and will be recognized above all as a new and daring understanding of truth.” (Sarailiev 2002: 73) – thus the author crosses over to the field of William James, and stays there until the very end of the book. Sarailiev interprets the theory-of-truth aspect of the doctrine not as an isolated phenomenon, but in the context of James’ other studies and above all his psychology. The book also contains a detailed analysis of the link between pragmatism and The Will to Believe, a book that is justly described as “the first precursor of James’ theory of truth” (Sarailiev 2002: 84). Sarailiev defines Schiller’s humanism and Dewey’s instrumentalism as developments and corrections of certain aspects of the theory of James. Statements stressing the importance of pragmatism as a theory of truth are also found in the introduction and conclusion of Pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002: 20, 206).

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1 We will be using and quoting the second edition of Pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002) since it contains a number of original corrections added by Ivan Sarailiev himself to his own copy of the book. Translations from Bulgarian are by me – A. T.
Having acquainted the readers with the views of James, Schiller and Dewey, Sarailiev (2002: 206–207) sums up the pragmatist theory in six brief tenets: true ideas are useful; they are verifiable; they are satisfying; truth is changeable; it is the work of man; it is made up of the consequences the idea leads to. This is how pragmatism was presented in Bulgaria in the Interwar period, and in this very form it found a group of zealous critics, namely the followers of German philosophy (see, e.g., Torbov 1929, Mihalchev 1939). Sarailiev himself knew that the most vehement criticism of pragmatism would come from the followers of German thought since he was aware of the incompatibility of the two traditions: “The inclination of the German philosophical mind to monism and absolutism does not predispose it to the perception of a doctrine [such as pragmatism] so impregnated with pluralism and radical empiricism” (Sarailiev 2002: 17).

Bearing in mind the development of humanist thought in the first half of the twentieth century, Sarailiev’s decision to focus on the pragmatic theory of truth is far from surprising. When William James presented his pragmatism, he was already a world-famous scholar and a professor who presented and developed his views in front of thousands of students. This helped his doctrine win wide acclaim and many followers around the whole world. The career of Peirce, by contrast, was quite the opposite. Few were familiar with his ideas and his lack of experience with students was one factor in rendering his style cryptic and often incomprehensible. In a letter to James dated March 20, 1910 Peirce (quoted in Fisch 1986: 36) wrote: “There is one way, were it open to me, my logic might find its way to people's brains. Namely, if I could find a class of young men […]”. However, this never happened in the last 30 years of his life. Max Fisch (1986: 297) quotes a very keen observation made by Paul Carus at the Third International Philosophical Congress at Heidelberg in 1908: “Peirce is the only one pragmatist who can think scientifically and with logical precision. The others write like novelists rather than philosophers”. Arguably, this is why the texts of the latter were more accessible and gained popularity. In brief, James’ ideas were widely propagated around the world, whereas Peirce’s remained largely unknown. Therefore wishing to present the most popular and up-to-date philosophical doctrine of the English-speaking world, Sarailiev made the logical choice of presenting the pragmatism of James. This, however, is no proof that he himself embraced it. In the conclusion of Pragmatism, Sarailiev (2002: 246) critically examines each of the six tenets and demonstrates, providing an extensive list of examples, that “the pragmatic theory of truth is true but within certain limits. It does not have universal validity”. Sarailiev even implies that he might write a separate work advancing his own theory of truth which would do away with the

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2 Tseko Torbov is the Bulgarian translator of Kant, while Dimitar Mihalchev is an ardent follower of the philosophy of Johannes Rehmke.
imperfections of the existing ones. Such a work, however, was never published, and is not among manuscripts preserved in the philosopher’s archives.

The pragmatism of Peirce in the works of Ivan Sarailiev

Sarailiev’s presentation of Peirce is more modest in volume in comparison with that of James. However, it is far more interesting and significant.

It should be noted that Peirce’s ideas, as opposed to pragmatism in general, were not widely known until the early 1970s. After his death in 1914, there were a few occasional attempts to popularise his work, such as the appendix of The Meaning of Meaning (Ogden and Richards 1923), the collection of Peirce’s philosophical essays Chance, Love, and Logic (Cohen 1923), and the first six volumes of the Collected Papers of Charles Peirce (1931–1958). These books, however, did not garner a great deal of interest even in academic circles and did not prompt any significant secondary studies. In the early 1940s, in his lectures at the University of Chicago, Charles Morris promulgated Peirce’s ideas, which was then largely followed by silence. Despite the fact that several monographs on Peirce appeared (Gallie 1952; Thompson 1953), in a 1959 Scientific American review, Ernest Nagel still referred to Peirce as a “little known American philosopher” (Nagel 1959).

It is all the more remarkable, then, that Sarailiev introduced his students to the life and views of the founder of pragmatism in the very beginning of the 1920s. Peirce’s fundamental essays were included in the list of recommended readings accompanying the course of lectures on pragmatism and contemporary American philosophy (CSA, 326). Later, in Sarailiev’s book Pragmatism we can find an essay entitled “Charles Peirce and his principle” in which Sarailiev quotes The Collected Papers of Charles Peirce – a fact quite astonishing, bearing in mind that Sarailiev’s book was published in 1938 (and the manuscript was already finished in 1937). The first six volumes of Collected Papers had just appeared from 1931 to 1935, and Sarailiev was already familiar with them in 1937. This edition of the Collected Papers (volumes 7 and 8 were published in 1958) still is the standard reference work today (although it may be replaced on completion of the chronological edition begun by the Peirce Edition Project in 1982). Moreover, an essay by Saraliev on Peirce was published even earlier in the Bulgarian journal School Review (1933). At that time, when the name and work of Charles Peirce had been almost forgotten, Sarailiev appreciated the genius of his insights – the Bulgarian philosopher was then effectively ahead of today’s massive interest in the founder of pragmatism and semiotics by more than three decades. This makes him one of the first scholars in Europe, and perhaps even in the world, who comprehended Peirce’s oeuvre.
Sarailiev justifiably underscores Peirce’s role as a founder of pragmatism – author of the term as well as the principle of pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002: 23). In presenting the method, he refers mainly to Peirce’s 1878 essay “How to make our ideas clear”, describing in detail the grades of clearness and the concept of thinking as a transition from doubt to belief. In this essay Peirce first presented the logical principle which became known as the *pragmatic maxim*: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (W 3: 266). Sarailiev specifically emphasizes this maxim (the only text in the essay marked in italics), stressing its importance in understanding Peirce’s ideas. He also gives special attention to “The fixation of belief” as an essay that complements “How to make our ideas clear”. Sarailiev focuses on one more aspect: the intervention of James and its consequences, i.e. the splitting of pragmatism into two trends.

As already mentioned, James’ pragmatist theory of truth was severely criticized in the publications of Bulgarian scholars. Against the backdrop of this vocal reaction, the silence from the same quarter that accompanied the presentation of Peirce’s method is rather unusual. The reasons might be related to the fact that Sarailiev focused mainly on James’ theory and thus all criticism was channeled in this direction. Or, perhaps the rest of the philosophers in Bulgaria at the time simply did not comprehend Peirce and were not ready to perceive his ideas even if presented in the most accessible manner and in their own language.

Peirce scholars today agree that his pragmatism is “a doctrine, connected with other doctrines in a system” (Fisch 1986: 269). This system includes also Peirce’s phaneroscopy (the doctrine of categories), fallibilism, evolutionary cosmology, abduction, conception of thinking, early cognitive theory and semiotics (or “semeiotic” – the term Peirce also used). These doctrines form a network in which each idea is connected with the others.

The relation between pragmatism and semiotics is particularly important for the present study. In the original version of pragmatism (that of Peirce) the pragmatic maxim was a criterion for ascertaining meaning, and the sign, being part of the process of semeiosis, was a carrier of this meaning. Peirce himself emphasized, implicitly and sometimes even explicitly, the close relation between pragmatism and semiotics. One example here is his claim that all thought is in signs. Another illustration is the self-observation Peirce shared in a draft of a letter addressed to Victoria Lady Welby: “It has never been in my power to study anything [...] except as a study of semeiotic” (Peirce 1977: 85–86). The pragmatic principle attains complete clarity only when analysed in the context of the theory of signs because “Peirce tries to describe the methods of pragmatism using the terms of the semiotic doctrine” (Mladenov 2004:
Or, metaphorically speaking, Peirce’s doctrine of signs is his pragmatism “vested” in semiotic terms.

This argument, however, is absent from Sarailiev’s comments on Peirce. The pragmatic method was reduced to the maxim, which is in fact only the kernel of pragmatism. The remaining parts of the system were not directly introduced to the scholarly life of Bulgaria. Yet a large portion of them formed part of Sarailiev’s own philosophical views. Without mentioning even once Peirce’s ideas in his books _General Ideas_ (1919), _On the Will_ (1924), _Contemporary Science and Religion_ (1931) and his philosophical diary published posthumously _Meditationes_ (2005), Sarailiev developed ideas rather similar to those of the founder of pragmatism. His works demonstrate affinities with Peirce’s fallibilism, critical common-sensism, abduction, his conception of truth and even his evolutionary cosmology. Let us now cite a few short examples from Ivan Sarailiev’s philosophy, as represented in these works, that illustrate this point.

Sarailiev (2005: 66–67) claims that our knowledge of reality and ourselves is always incomplete, partial and fallible:

Can we think that today’s understanding [of reality] is true? It is perfectly possible that in time a new theory shall be proposed and we shall start seeing today’s as erroneous. [...] This is how scientific knowledge moves forward, constantly striving to understand reality, constantly replacing certain explanations with new ones, scratching the surface of a reality, which in its hidden essence remains forever unknown.

The gnoseological system developed by Sarailiev leads to the conclusion that the search for absolute truth must persist and yet there is also a clear understanding that it can never be brought to an end. This conclusion coincides completely with the views of Peirce; the latter was convinced that adequate knowledge is unattainable, so much so that he even relinquished the name “pragmatism” when James broadened his own method for ascertaining meaning into a theory of truth.

Incomplete and fallible knowledge is often not a hindrance in our everyday lives. It often turns out that a certain idea or theory might work well even if it is not true. What is more, on the basis of such ideas humans can “control” phenomena around them. Ivan Sarailiev’s favorite example is electricity: there was no adequate theory for the nature of electricity for a very long time; yet this did not prevent humankind from using and managing it.

Sarailiev maintained that there were two opposing forces or two principles that created the world and determined its development, namely determination (necessity) and indetermination (chance, freedom). Absolute necessity and absolute freedom do not exist in any phenomenon. They are a “boundary, approached yet never
reached by reality” (Sarailiev 1924: 191). Even matter, which is usually perceived as
the realm of determination, is pierced by a streak of freedom. Undoubtedly, at the
macrocosmic level, matter is determined. However, the atoms and electrons of which
it consists move freely. What makes this possible is the fact that “macrophysical
regularities do not suggest microphysical regularity; and microphysical irregularity
can have a macrophysical regularity with a probability that may come very close
to certainty bearing in mind the large number of individuals participating in
macrophysical phenomena” (Sarailiev 1938b: 12). From here on, Sarailiev’s logic
follows Berkeley: it is obvious that atoms and electrons have no consciousness.
Therefore, there must be another enormous consciousness external to them that
causes this free movement. We all live within the thought of this consciousness. This
is the thought of “a Creator who is a spirit and whose relationship to the world he
has created is the same as the relationship between the artist and his work of art”
(Sarailiev 1931: 20). This is how Sarailiev reaches the idea of God. Or in the words
of Peirce: “Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion
is in body we ought to say that we are in thoughts and not that thoughts are in us”
(W 2: 227, footnote 4). And, later: “Should every mind cease to think [an idea] for
a while, for so long it ceases to exist. Its permanent existence is kept up by its being
an idea in the mind of God” (W 2: 480).

When we put together all Sarailiev’s claims concerning the role of deter-
mination and chance in the universe, we end up with the diagram of his model of
the world (Figure 1). The white section of the diagram above illustrates the role of
chance, while the marked section indicates the role of determination. We can see the
correlation between them in each phenomenon: thought, art, language, matter, etc.
Thought comes closest to absolute freedom, followed by art, language, etc. The direc-
tion of development of the universe is from right to left, i.e. from absolute freedom/
chance to absolute necessity (the rightmost and leftmost sections of the diagram,
respectively) because everything in the universe stems from the pure thought of the
Creator. When Sarailiev discusses the lack of pure chance and pure determination,
he refers to the middle section only. Human life occurs in this section. The other two
stages make up the infinite past and future, respectively.

Peirce defines the development of the universe in the same manner: “At any
time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world
becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is
at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future” (W 8: 110). Simultaneously, the
three stages of the Universe (see the diagram above) correspond largely to Peirce’s
“tychism”, “synechism” and “agapism” (or “chance”, “continuity” and “habit”).

Sarailiev maintains that people think in general ideas which are the smallest,
integral part of our thought. They are nothing more than mere hypotheses we
use when approaching the world. “When I think”, Sarailiev writes, “I feel a kind of vacillation” between two terms (Sarailiev 1919: 59). The function of thought, according to him, is to surmount difficulties. Therefore, one of the terms must be the initial stage, the problem, which we are faced with, and the final one – the surmounted difficulty. The galvanization between them, i.e. the action of thought, stops, when the final point is reached. The aim of thinking, then, is to lead us between these two points. The final chord is an action, caused by thought, because for Sarailiev (1919: 75) “psychological and even cognitive processes are never cognitive only; we know in order to act; knowledge helps action”. Although we are not in a position to overcome matter, we are always in a situation that provokes thinking. The action, marking the end of a thought, is a potential beginning of another thought. The process of thinking never stops. This is just a version of Peirce’s notion of “unlimited semiosis” (CP 1.339).

Figure 1. The model of the world according to the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev.

Sarailiev’s view on thinking is identical with Peirce’s conception of thought in his essay *How to make our ideas clear*. The difference is merely terminological. Peirce calls the starting point “doubt”, and the final one – “belief”: “[…] the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained”. “Doubt” and “belief” mean respectively “the starting of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it” (W 3: 261).

Sarailiev’s proposition asserts that the most important part of the described process is the general idea/hypothesis that plays the role of a mediator between the two extremes. Therefore the knowledge we attain at the end of the thinking process is neither completely new, nor immediate, but is always determined by previous
knowledge. Peirce reached the same conclusion: “No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist […]” (W 2: 210).

These are but a few of Sarailiev’s ideas that prove very similar to the philosophy of Peirce. The forced discontinuation of the career of this Bulgarian scholar probably prevented him from collecting these ideas into a unified doctrine. They remain dispersed in his books yet their presence is a fact that allows us to call Sarailiev not only a promoter, but rather a representative, of pragmatism following Peirce’s doctrine. Finding such an early promoter of Peirce is interesting; finding such an early fellow traveller of Peirce is really intriguing.

It is not only the historical value of Ivan Sarailiev’s ideas that should be considered. For example, his pragmatic ideas on creation and reception of works of art can be used as an interpretative method in contemporary literary criticism (see Tashev 2012), but this remains beyond the scope of the current article.

Conclusion with a transition to semiotics

From the above we can conclude that from Sarailiev’s perspective the pragmatism of James and his followers boiled down to the six tenets cited above, whereas the original version of the doctrine appeared in Peirce’s classic essay “How to make our ideas clear”. The Bulgarian philosopher repeatedly stated that the theory of truth was more important with regard to the history of human thought. However, his own philosophical views seem to state otherwise. He did not appear to accept the Jamesian theory and his thoughts lead him to conclusions that coincided with those made by Peirce. This opens a whole new field for contemporary humanities. Since Peirce’s semiotics is similar to his pragmatism, then being a pragmatist Ivan Sarailiev was also a semiotician. Therefore he lay the beginnings of semiotic thought in Bulgaria in the early 1920s – before Louis Hjelmslev, Juri Lotman, Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco, and opened a new chapter in the history of semiotics to be yet unfolded.

References


CSA = Central State Archives, Fund 1982K (personal fund of Ivan Sarailiev), Inventory 1, 443 archival units. [In-text references are to CSA, followed by archival unit.]


The two pragmatisms in the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev


W = Peirce, Charles S. 1982–.

Два прагматизма в философии Ивана Сарыилиева

В фокусе данной статьи находятся взгляды Ивана Сарыилиева (1887–1969) на два направления в прагматизме: метод определения значения, предложенный Чарльзом Сандерсом Пирсом, и теорию истины Уильяма Джеймса. Сарыилиев был ранним представителем и интерпретатором прагматизма в Болгарии, применявшим и пропагандировавшим идеи Пирса в 1920-е годы, будучи, таким образом, одним из первых последователей Пирса в Европе и первым – в Восточной Европе. Но насколько глубоко понимал Сарыилиев два типа прагматизма? Как они воздействовали на его философию? Автор статьи ищет ответы на эти вопросы и дает обзор рецепции прагматизма в Болгарии в период между двумя войнами, сосредотачиваясь на Сарыилиеве, который был единственным серьезным последователем прагматизма как тогда, так и в течение долгих лет позднее.

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Kaks pragmatismi Ivan Sarailievi filosoofias